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Abstract
Business artifacts are a growing topic in service oriented computing. Artifact systems include
both data and process descriptions at interface level thereby providing more sophisticated
and powerful service inter-operation capabilities. The Guard-Stage-Milestone (GSM) language
provides a novel framework for specifying artifact systems that features declarative descriptions
of the intended behaviour without requiring an explicit specification of the control flow. While
much of the research is focused on the design, deployment and maintenance of GSM programs,
the verification of this formalism has received less attention. This thesis aims to contribute to
the topic.
We put forward a holistic methodology for the practical verification of GSM-based multi-agent
systems via model checking. The formal verification faces several challenges: the declarative
nature of GSM programs; the mechanisms for data hiding and access control; and the infinite
state spaces inherent in the underlying data. We address them in stages.
First, we develop a symbolic representation of GSM programs, which makes them amenable
to model checking. We then extend GSM to multi-agent systems and map it into a variant
of artifact-centric multi-agent systems (AC-MAS), a paradigm based on interpreted systems.
This allows us to reason about the knowledge the agents have about the artifact system. Lastly,
we investigate predicate abstraction as a key technique to overcome the difficulty of verifying
infinite state spaces. We present a technique that lifts 3-valued abstraction to epistemic logic and
makes GSM programs amenable to model checking against specifications written in a quantified
version of temporal-epistemic logic.
The theory serves as a basis for developing a symbolic model checker that implements
SMT-based, 3-valued abstraction for GSM-based multi-agent systems. The feasibility of the
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It has long been argued [SRG99, BSF06] that multi-agent systems (MAS) are a fitting paradigm
for service oriented computing (SOC). Indeed, agent-based research, traditionally applied in
robotics, telecommunication, and logistics, has contributed a wealth of techniques ranging from
protocols [SH05], verification [RL07], and actual prototype implementations [MBM10]. SOC
is currently a fast moving research area with significant industrial involvement where highly
scalable implementations play a key role. Agent-based solutions can shape developments in
SOC if they remain anchored to emerging paradigms being put forward by the leading players
in the area.
An emerging and fast growing topic being investigated in SOC is that of business arti-
facts [NC03, CDH+08, CH09, NBTM09]. Differently from the standard process-based paradigm
popular in SOC, in artifact systems data is given the same prominence as processes. While
in traditional service composition, processes are advertised at interface level, in the artifact
approach both processes and the data structures, upon which processes are meant to operate,
play a key role in the service description and implementations. It is argued [CH09] that ab-
stracting entirely from the data, as it is done in traditional business process modelling, amounts
to an excessive simplification and leads to models that are no longer meaningful to be used with
complex, information-oriented applications. Indeed, in e-commerce, e-business and e-government,
documents and their structures play the same fundamental role in characterising the state of a
system as the various operations to be conducted on the system by the stakeholders.
Several approaches for specifying and implementing business artifacts have been put forward
in the literature, including standard finite-state machines [CDH+08] and Proclets [vdABEW01].
Guard-Stage-Milestone (GSM) is one of the frameworks that has recently gained promi-
nence [HDF+11, HDDM+11, DHV11] In line with some of the AI and agent-based tradition,
GSM is a fully declarative language. It provides a description of stages, which are governed
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by guards controlling their activation. Stages represent clusters of activity designed to achieve
operational objectives called milestones. The main advantage of this formalism is that it closely
follows the natural way of thinking about the different stages of a working process and the
necessary milestones required to achieve a certain goal. A complex artifact system can support
a large number of services, involving many stakeholders. This makes assessing whether the
system will behave as intended difficult. It is therefore desirable to have a mechanism in place
to ensure the validity of the design.
Indeed, verification of services is a very active field of research [FBS04, PBB+04, LQSS07,
PABS11, LQS12]. Formal verification consists in proving that a design solution satisfies a set of
requirement specifications. One particular technique, called model checking [CGP99, BCM+90],
is seen to have several advantages over other approaches [Cla08], such as testing or theorem
proving: it can be very efficient; it does not require correctness proofs; it may handle partial
specifications; it is fully automatic; and it may show counterexamples. In model checking, the
system is described as a mathematical model, and the specifications are formulated as formulas
in some modal logic. The verification task then amounts to checking whether the model under
analysis satisfies these formulas.
Model checking is not only becoming an industrial standard for hardware verification [SV03,
SA11], but it has also been shown to be a promising technique for the verification of reac-
tive systems, distributed systems, and multi-agent systems [BFPW03, PL03, RL07]. MAS
are typically specified by means of modal languages strictly stronger than plain temporal
logic and primitives used in specifications often include modalities for knowledge [FHMV95],
cooperation [AHK02], obligations [MW93] and others. In the past ten years model check-
ing toolkits supporting specifications incorporating some of these concepts have been put
forward [GvdM04, KNN+08, LQR09].
On one hand, while the underlying techniques and capabilities vary, they all feature languages
aimed at system modelling, rather than programming languages for MAS. It has long been
recognised [CGL94] that considerable progress in system verification can be achieved by devising
incomplete verification methodologies operating directly on the source code. This approach has
found its natural application in standalone software verification [ BBF+10]. The verification is
inevitably incomplete because the system properties are often undecidable. The same approach
is also attractive in a variety of distributed applications, including MAS.
On the other hand, GSM-based services are an attractive, rapidly evolving area of research
that currently lacks automatic verification methodologies. Nonetheless, several approaches to
the verification of business artifacts have been investigated in the literature. The first attempts
appear in [DSV07, DHPV09], where the lifecycles of artifacts are based on finite-state machines.
This, however, does not correspond to declarative GSM programs. Other contributions have
also studied this problem from a theoretical perspective [BLP11, BLP12a, BLP12b, BL13,
BHCDG+13]. The obtained results identify decidable fragments either through restrictions on
the specification language or the semantics. While these results are certainly valuable, they
1.2 problem statement | 3
provide no constructive methodology for the practical verification. Our work addresses these
limitations as we detail in the following section.
1.2 Problem Statement
The goal of the research presented in this thesis is to develop automatic model
checking techniques for the practical verification of GSM-based multi-agent systems.
The raison d’eˆtre of a model checker is to offer functionalities for the verification of targeted
systems. Thus, an important necessity is, of course, the capability of modelling these systems.
We focus our efforts on GSM as it has gained a prominent position among these approaches and is
substantially influencing the emerging Case Management Modelling Notation standard [Obj12].
Model checking GSM has its intrinsic difficulties and it is hard to carry out in full. We set the
following objectives that we address in this thesis in order to successfully verify GSM-based
multi-agent systems GSM-MAS against a rich specification language.
1. A mechanism to reason about GSM programs in the context of multi-agent systems.
A GSM program only deals with the machinery related to the artifact system and does
not include a description of the agents interacting with it. In Section 3.1 we extend plain
GSM programs with a set of external agents to form GSM-MAS. This extensions provides
a mechanism to better model and verify complex interactions between agents and the
artifact system.
2. Translating declarative specification of artifact lifecycles into finite-state machines.
The main difference between GSM programs and FSM models used by most model checkers
is that GSM lifecycles are declarative, even though GSM can simulate the FSM approach.
We address this problem in Section 3.3 by translating GSM programs into a transition
system using its incremental semantics. These are based primarily on conditions and rules
that govern GSM lifecycles and we build a symbolic transition relation by incremental
application of the rules.
3. Implementation of abstraction techniques for verification of infinite-state systems.
A major obstacle for model checking artifact systems arises from the fact that data can
have infinite domains. A complete verification algorithm for an arbitrary infinite-state
system cannot be designed as the verification is, in general, undecidable. We investigate a
possible solution in Chapter 4. We deal with this problem by placing restrictions on the
system and build a finite, abstract model of the original system under these restrictions.
In particular, we employ 3-valued predicate abstraction to simultaneously build under-
and over-approximations of the concrete system and then verify both abstract systems
using standard model checking algorithms.
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The contributions of the undertaken research are both theoretical and practical. On one
hand, in Chapters 3 and 4 we develop model checking techniques that aim to achieve the above
objectives. On the other hand, we provide an actual implementation of the methodology in
Chapter 5 and evaluate it in Chapter 6.
1.3 Publications
Part of the results presented in this thesis have been published in the proceedings of the following
international conferences and workshops:
• Model checking of plain GSM programs described in Section 3.3 appears in the Proceedings
of the 2012 IEEE 19th International Conference on Web Services [GGL12].
• Model checking of GSM-based multi-agent systems presented throughout Chapter 3
appears in Service-Oriented Computing – ICSOC 2013 Workshops [GGL14].
• Predicate abstraction of GSM-based multi-agent systems reported in Chapter 4 appears
in Service-Oriented Computing – ICSOC 2015 [GGL15].
The research has also been documented in three deliverables D2.2.1-3 Model checking tool
for artifact interoperations (MOCAI) – Iteration I-III [GBLP11, GGB+12, GGL+13] of the EU
FP7 project ACSI (FP7-ICT-257593).
1.4 Structure of the Thesis
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows. In Chapter 2 we introduce basic concepts from
existing literature. Specifically, we outline the theoretical framework for business artifacts with
GSM lifecycles, and provide background on model checking and predicate abstraction.
In Chapter 3 we first describe how business artifacts and agents can be combined to form
GSM-MAS. Then we give a formal map from these systems to artifact-centric multi-agent
systems (AC-MAS) and define the model checking problem of AC-MAS against specifications in
the temporal-epistemic logic IQ-CTLK, which supports quantification over artifact instances.
Finally, we propose a constructive methodology for the practical model checking of AC-MAS.
In Chapter 4 we employ 3-valued predicate abstraction to overcome the state explosion
problem that stems from the underlying data. The abstraction only captures the key information
required for the behavioural analysis of the system. We lift the technique to the epistemic setting
and define the satisfaction relation. We then show how abstractions of GSM-MAS programs
can be constructed with the help of an SMT solver.
In Chapter 5 we introduce gsmc, a symbolic model checker that implements the methodology
in C/C++. An important feature of the tool is that it operates directly on GSM programs that
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can be deployed on an GSM engine. We detail the internal architecture of gsmc, its inputs, as
well as the user interface and development tools used.
In Chapter 6 we evaluate gsmc on two real-world scenarios. We present Order-to-Cash, a
simplified version of an IBM back-end order management application [HDDM+11], and discuss
its verification with and without abstraction. We also look at Flanders Research Information
Space Program, a pilot application developed for the ACSI project [TGMODLM13].
In Chapter 7 we give final remarks on the results presented here and draw conclusions on
model checking GSM-based multi-agent systems. We also discuss existing work related to this
thesis, along with possible future developments.
2 Background
Here we introduce the essential concepts from the existing literature underpinning the work
presented in the following chapters. Specifically, we outline the theoretical framework for
business artifacts with GSM lifecycles, and provide background on symbolic model checking
and 3-valued abstraction.
2.1 Business Artifacts with GSM Lifecycles
Business artifacts [NC03, CDH+08, CH09, NBTM09] form a conceptual basis for modelling
business processes. Guard-Stage-Milestone [HDF+11, HDDM+11, DHV11] is a declarative
language for implementing artifact systems. The most recent version of the language, called
GSMkernel, has been put forward in [SHV12]. In this version, milestones can be free-standing,
i.e., not attached to a stage, which results in a simpler and more streamlined language than
GSMclassic introduced here. This thesis follows the formal definition of the original GSMclassic,
or simply GSM, presented in [HDDM+11].
2.1.1 GSM Programs
Informally, a GSM program is the set of all artifact instances in the system. Artifact types,
which correspond to classes of key business entities, provide the key structure for the program.
Each type has:
Information model which captures data about all artifact instances of that type during their
lifetime in the system.
Lifecycle model which specifies the possible ways an instance might progress through the
system by responding to events.
The Information model uses attribute-value pairs to hold the relevant data, while GSM
provides a declarative, hierarchical mechanism for specifying lifecycle models. At the core of the
lifecycle model lies the notion of stage. This consists of three following concepts:
Milestone which represents an operational objective that can be achieved or invalidated and
corresponds to one of the ways in which a stage might reach completion.
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Figure 2.1: A lifecycle model.
Stage body which is a hierarchical cluster of activity intended to achieve a milestone. This can
be either a set of sub-stages, or a task. A stage becomes open when one of its milestones
is achieved.
Guard which controls the entry into the stage body, in which case a stage becomes active.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the lifecycle model on a fragment of the Customer Order artifact
type from the Order-to-Cash scenario described in Section 2.1.3. Here  represent guards, ◦
represent milestones, and the arrows represent dependencies between them. Labels on arrows
denote incoming events. Preparing is a top-level stage, whilst Research & Order, Receiving, and
Assembling are atomic stages.
We now formally define the structure of the GSM program [HDDM+11], starting with the
definition of artifact type, which provides the template for instances of business artifacts.
Definition 1 (Artifact Type). An artifact type AT is a tuple AT = 〈R,Att, Lcyc〉, where R is
the name of the artifact type; Att is the information model as set of attributes; and Lcyc is the
lifecycle model.
The information model Att is partitioned into the set Attdata of data attributes to hold
business relevant data and the set Attstatus of status attributes to capture the state of the lifecycle
model. Each stage has a Boolean status attribute in Attstatus, which is true if and only if the
stage is active. Similarly, each milestone has a Boolean status attribute in Attstatus, which is
true if and only if the milestone has been achieved. We write Dom for the domain of attributes
in Att including the undefined value ⊥. An artifact instance of an artifact type AT is a tuple
ι = 〈AT,A1 : c1, . . . , Ak : ck〉, where ci ∈ Dom(Ai). Note that data attributes can attain any
value, which potentially makes a GSM program an infinite-state system.
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The communication between artifact instances and actors the environment, which is not
covered by the formalisation of GSM, is performed through incoming and generated events,
which can be either a 1-way message, a 2-way service call, or an instance creation request.
Incoming messages contain payloads, and those sent from the environment are called typed
external events.
Definition 2 (Event Type). An event type ET is a tuple ET = 〈E,AT,A1, . . . , Al〉, where E
is the name of the event type, AT is an artifact type, and Ai ∈ Attdata, where Attdata is the set
of data attributes of AT .
An event instance of an event type E is a tuple e = 〈ι, A1 : c1, . . . , Al : cl〉, where ι is an
artifact instance and ci ∈ Dom(Ai) for i ∈ [1 . . . l]. The tuple p = 〈A1 : c1, . . . , Al : cl〉 is the
payload of e. Generated events are created by tasks contained in atomic stages, i.e., stages
without sub-stages.
Both milestones and guards are controlled declaratively through sentries. A sentry of an
artifact instance ι is an expression χ(ι), which has one of the following three forms: “on ξ(ι) if
ϕ(ι)”; “on ξ(ι)”; “if ϕ(ι)”, where ξ(ι) is an event expression for the triggering event e of ι and
ϕ(ι) is a well-formed formula over the instances occurring in the system. Milestones have one or
more achieving sentries and optionally one or more invalidating sentries, whilst guards have
exactly one associated sentry. We now have all the ingredients to define a GSM program and
its snapshot.
Definition 3 (GSM Program). A GSM program Γ is a set of n artifact types ATi for i ≤ n
and m event types ETj for j ≤ m.
Definition 4 (Snapshot of GSM Program). A pre-snapshot of Γ is an assignment Σ that maps
each attribute A ∈ Attι of each active artifact instance ι to an element of Dom(A). A snapshot
of Γ is a pre-snapshot that satisfies the following GSM invariants: all sub-stages of an inactive
stage are inactive; all milestones of an active stage are false; at most one milestone of a stage
can be achieved at any time.
2.1.2 GSM Semantics
The operational semantics of a GSM program Γ is based on the notion of a business step
(B-step), which corresponds to the impact of a single incoming event e on a snapshot Σ of the
full GSM program, and is considered the smallest unit of relevant change that occurs in the
system. A B-step has the form of a tuple 〈Σ, e,Σ′, Gen〉, where Σ, Σ′ are snapshots, e is an
incoming external event, and Gen is a set of outgoing external events generated by the opening
of atomic stages during the B-step. We also write (Σ′, Gen) = δ(Σ, e) to denote a step in the
execution of the GSM program. The operational semantics of GSM has the following three
equivalent formulations [HDDM+11]:
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Table 2.1: PAC rule templates.
Rule Prerequisite Antecedent Consequent
PAC-1 ¬ι.activeS χ(ι) ∧ ι.activeS′ +ι.activeS
PAC-2 ι.activeS χ(ι) +ι.m
PAC-3 ι.m χ(ι) −ι.m
PAC-4 ι.m on +ι.activeS −ι.m
PAC-5 ι.activeS on +ι.m −ι.activeS
PAC-6 ι.activeS on −ι.activeS′ −ι.activeS
Incremental which corresponds to the incremental application of so-called PAC rules and
provides a natural, direct approach for implementation.
Fixed-point which provides a top-down description of the effect of a single incoming event on
an artifact snapshot.
Closed-form which provides a characterisation of snapshots and the effects of events using a
first-order logic formula.
These formulations have different motivations and purpose. However, it has been shown
in [DHV11] that the three GSM semantics are equivalent for all well-formed GSM programs.
We discuss only the incremental formulation here, which serves as the basis for the approach
put forward in the following chapters.
In the incremental semantics [HDDM+11], the impact of e is gradually constructed from
1) the immediate effect of the event, which can assign payload to data attributes and 2) a
re-evaluation of the conditions in Γ by Prerequisite-Antecedent-Consequent (PAC) rules that
can lead to changes in guards and milestones.
The abstract PAC rules are listed in Table 2.1. Each PAC rule consists of the following three
parts: the prerequisite (P ) determines whether the rule is relevant to the previous snapshot Σ;
the antecedent (A) contains a user-defined condition χ(ι) and is evaluated relative to the next
snapshot Σ′; the consequent (C) specifies the change to the value of a status attribute in the
next snapshot Σ′ if the rule is relevant and if A holds in Σ′. The first three PAC rules in the
table are concerned with updating the status attributes on certain events, and the last three
rules preserve invariants of the model. More specifically, PAC-1 governs the activation of the
stage S if its guard χ(ι) holds and its parent S ′ is active; PAC-2 determines the achievement
of the milestone m if its corresponding stage S is active and its condition χ(ι) holds; PAC-3
controls the invalidation of milestonem if it was achieved before and its invalidating condition
χ(ι) is true; PAC-4 directs the invalidation of the milestone m when its corresponding stage S
becomes active; PAC-5 governs the inactivation of the stage S when its milestone m is achieved;
and PAC-6 induces the inactivation of the stage S when its parent S ′ becomes inactive.
The incoming event e triggers a sequence of pre-snapshots Σ0,Σ1, . . . ,Σn with Σ0 = Σ,
Σ1 = ImmEffecte(Σ0), and Σn = Σ
′. The transition between pre-snapshots Σi and Σi+1 is
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Figure 2.2: Incremental computation of the GSM B-step as shown in [HDDM+11].
called a micro-step, whilst the B-step constitutes the transition from the snapshot Σ to Σ′.
The PAC rules are sequentially applied to Σi until a fixed point is reached. Each micro-step
can generate an outgoing event if its associated atomic stage becomes active. These events
are collected and sent to the environment in the last micro-step. Figure 2.2 illustrates the
incremental computation of a B-step.
The Toggle-once Principle, that states that each status attribute can change its value at
most once through the application of PAC rules, guarantees that the application of PAC rules
terminates since there is a finite number of PAC rules. The prerequisites in PAC rules guarantee
that the principle holds. The inertial property states that status attributes should not change
between snapshot unless there is a visible reason. To ensure that the rules adhere to the property,
circular dependencies among PAC rules are not allowed, i.e., there must not be a set of rules
where each C of a rule changes a status attribute required in A of another rule.
A suitable order of the PAC rules is achieved via topological sort of the polarised dependency
graph PDG(Γ) associated with GSM model Γ [HDDM+11]. The set of nodes of the graph
contains the nodes for all the guards, stages and milestones for each artifact type R in Γ. The
set of edges represents the dependencies between individual nodes and it is based on ground
PAC rules for Γ. This full PDG may contain cycles that are not present if we focus on rules
that can fire from a single incoming event. To overcome this problem, event-relativised PDGE is
defined, such that for a given incoming event type E, the graph is constructed from the full
PDG by removing all sentries that involve an incoming event type other than E. The GSM
model Γ is well-formed if all event-relativised PDGE(Γ) satisfy the acyclicity condition.
Figure 2.3 shows these graphs for Preparing stage of Customer Order artifact type from the
Order-to-Cash scenario. + in front of a guard indicates that its sentry becomes true, +/− in front
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Figure 2.3: Partial polarised dependency graph of Customer Order.
of a stage indicates that the stage is active/inactive, and +/− in front of a milestone indicates
that the milestone is achieved/invalidated. The solid arrows indicate dependencies between
guards, stages and milestones for any event, and the dashed and dotted arrows correspond to
the Receive Part and Assemble events respectively.
2.1.3 Case Study: Order-to-Cash
To illustrate the scenarios in which the GSM framework may be applied, we briefly present
a simplified version of the Order-to-Cash case study from IBM [HDDM+11]. We also use
it as a concise running example to explain the concepts introduced throughout this thesis.
Order-to-Cash is a back-end order management application, in which a seller operates under
the so-called make-to-order mode. The manufacturing of a product is scheduled based on a
confirmed purchase order from a buyer.
Figure 2.4 gives a single-artifact design of the Order-to-Cash application. The process starts
when the seller receives a purchase order for a product from a buyer. This initiating purchase
order refers to only one product. Upon receiving a buyer purchase order, the seller sends back
an acknowledgement and starts processing the order. First, the seller internally creates a work
order, that is, a document that allows the seller to keep track of the manufacturing of the
product requested by the buyer.
Manufacturing of a product requires multiple components, and these components are typically
sourced from multiple suppliers. Each component in the work order undergoes some processing
during which a procurement officer researches and selects a suitable supplier for the component
in question. The assembly of the product can begin when some of the components that resulted
from splitting a buyer order have been received. After all components have been delivered, the
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ordered product is finalised and shipped to the buyer. Also, an invoice is created and sent to
the buyer.
The buyer can cancel a purchase order at any time before the delivery of the product. When
this happens and the seller agrees with the cancellation, a cancellation fee is assessed. Otherwise
the items will be delivered and invoiced in full.
2.1.4 i-Hub GSM Programs
ACSI Interoperation Hub [LBH13], or i-Hub, is a software for designing and executing GSM
artifact systems. The i-Hub evolved from Siena [CDH+08] and Barcelona [HHV11], which were
originally developed by IBM Watson for experiments with business artifacts. The software
provides design tools for modelling business artifacts. These models are transformed into i-Hub
applications, which can then be immediately deployed onto the i-Hub execution engine to run
the artifact systems.
An i-Hub application consists of an XML definition of the artifact system and an XSD file
that describes data types used in the application. The sentries of guards and milestones are
specified using either the Java Expression Language (JEXL) or the Object Constraint Language
(OCL). Both are declarative languages for describing rules that apply to a GSM program,
although JEXL has somewhat less expressive power than OCL. In particular, it does not support
quantification over data.
We now describe the syntax of an i-Hub GSM application. Listing 2.1 shows an excerpt of
the Order-to-Cash use case. The structure of the application is a hierarchy, where the sections
are delimited by the tags <ca:Identifier ...> and </ca:Identifier>. Elements without
subsection are written as single tags <ca:Identifier .../>. The example contains the main
sections of the program, but omits repetitions of sections of the same kind and some details.
The root element of an i-Hub GSM application, called ca:CompositeApplication on Line 1,
incorporates definitions of all artifact and event types. An artifact type is defined by the element
ca:Component on Line 2 with two attributes id and name containing the identifier and the
name of the type.
The child element ca:InformationModel on Line 3 specifies the information model of the
artifact. Importantly, the attribute schemaUri in its child element ca:DataItem includes the
path to an external XSD file with the definition of data types. All data attributes of a given
artifact are declared as elements xs:attribute in this XSD file. Each data attribute has name
and type, which can be either primitive, e.g., “xs:int”, “xs:string”, etc., or user defined. These
non-primitive data types are defined using the element xs:complexType and the definition is
recursive in a sense that it is composed of attributes that can be complex types themselves.
The GSM lifecycle of an artifact is defined on Line 6 in the element ca:GuardedStageModel.
Children of this element represent top level stages of the artifact and are declared in ele-
ments ca:Stage with attributes id, name, and description. Stage guards are defined by
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Figure 2.4: Order-to-Cash artifact lifecycle.
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Listing 2.1: Excerpt from Order-to-Cash i-Hub application, consistent with Figure 2.4.
1 <ca:CompositeApplication name=‘‘OrderToCash’’>
2 <ca:Component id=‘‘CustomerOrder’’ name=‘‘CustomerOrder’’>
3 <ca:InformationModel id=‘‘COInformationModel’’ rootDataItemId=‘‘CustomerOrder’’>
4 <ca:DataItem id=‘‘CO’’ schemaUri=‘‘CO.xsd’’ rootElement=‘‘CustomerOrder’’ />
5 </ca:InformationModel>
6 <ca:GuardedStageModel id=‘‘CO GSM’’ name=‘‘CustomerOrder’’ description=‘‘’’>
7 <ca:Stage id=‘‘CO GSM0’’ name=‘‘CustomerOrderProcessing’’ description=‘‘’’>
8 <ca:StageGuard id=‘‘CO GSM0g0’’ name=‘‘Init’’
9 expression=‘‘GSM.milestoneAchievedOnEvent(‘Initialized‘)’’ eventIds=‘‘’’/>
10 <ca:Milestone id=‘‘CO GSM0m0’’ name=‘‘Received’’ eventIds=‘‘’’>
11 <ca:Condition expression=‘‘GSM.isMilestoneAchieved(‘Shipped‘)’’/>
12 </ca:Milestone>
13 <ca:Milestone id=‘‘CO GSM0m1’’ name=‘‘Cancelled’’ eventIds=‘‘OnCancel’’>
14 <ca:Condition expression=‘‘GSM.isEventOccurring(‘OnCancel‘)’’/>
15 </ca:Milestone>
16 <ca:SubStage id=‘‘CO GSM1’’ name=‘‘Submiting’’ description=‘‘’’>
17 <ca:StageGuard id=‘‘CO GSM1g0’’ name=‘‘Submit’’
18 expression=‘‘GSM.isEventOccurring(‘OnSubmit‘)’’ eventIds=‘‘’’/>




23 <ca:SubStage id=‘‘CO GSM7’’ name=‘‘Receiving’’ description=‘‘’’>
24 <ca:StageGuard id=‘‘CO GSM7g0’’ name=‘‘Receive’’
25 expression=‘‘GSM.isEventOccurring(‘OnReceivePO‘)’’ eventIds=‘‘OnReceivePO’’/>
26 <ca:Milestone id=‘‘CO GSM7m0’’ name=‘‘AllPOsReceived’’ eventIds=‘‘’’>
27 <ca:Condition expression=‘‘{CustomerOrder./PurchaseOrders/Received} == 3’’/>
28 </ca:Milestone>
29 [...]
30 <ca:Task id=‘‘ReceivingTask’’ name=‘‘ReceivingTask’’>
31 <ca:Invoke serviceDefinitionId=‘‘ReceivePO’’>
32 <ca:InputMapping type=‘‘set’’>
33 <ca:Source srcId=‘‘CO’’ refType=‘‘artifact’’ xPath=‘‘CustomerOrder/ID’’/>














48 <ca:EventModel id=‘‘COEventModel’’ name=‘‘CustomerOrderProcessingEventModel’’>
49 <ca:Event id=‘‘E0’’ name=‘‘OnCreate’’>
50 <ca:InputMsg id=‘‘E0Req’’ schemaUri=‘‘data/E0In.xsd’’ rootElement=‘‘E0InputMsg’’/>
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ca:StageGuard. In addition to the usual attributes id, name, and description, stage guards
have the attributes eventIds to lists events that are relevant for activating the stage, expression
with the actual condition for the activation, and the optional attribute language that can be
used to specify the language (OCL or JEXL) used in the condition.
The element ca:Milestone, e.g., on lines 10 and 19, uses the attributes id, name, and
eventIds as defined above and contains at least one element ca:Condition to describe an
achieving sentry of the milestone, and possibly a list of elements ca:InvalidateCondition to de-
scribe invalidating sentries of the milestone. Both elements have similar syntax as ca:StageGuard
with attributes id, name, expression, and language.
A composite stage also contains a list of sub-stages, defined by elements ca:SubStage, which
have the same structure as the element ca:Stage. An atomic stage may have a task specified by
the element ca:Task on Line 30. It has attributes id and name and can perform two different
actions. Either a service, such as creation of a new artifact instance, can be invoked by the
element ca:Invoke with attribute serviceDefinitionId, or values can be assigned to some
data attributes via the element ca:Assign. The element ca:Mapping denotes the assignment
to the data and its attribute type determines whether the current value will be overwritten or a
new value will be added to a collection of attributes. Child elements ca:Source and ca:Target
then determine the actual value to be assigned and the data attribute in question.
Finally, the element ca:EventModel on Line 48 includes all incoming events that an actor in
the environment can send to the artifact system. Each such event has a corresponding element
ca:Event with attributes id, name, and description. Its child element ca:InputMessage
defines the payload of the event while ca:OutputMessage carries the response of the system.
Both elements have attributes id, schemaUri, which contains a valid path to the XSD definition
of the message, and rootElement, which defines the root element of the XSD file.
In addition, an i-Hub application supports the Artifact Authorisation Views model. The
model defines authorisation constraints for each artifact type in the application. It consists
of Participant Filter, which specifies a condition on user information, and two transformation
models. The Information Transformation model specifies how the artifact instance data can
be accessed by a user. The Lifecycle Transformation model specifies how the artifact lifecycle
model is exposed to a participant.
2.2 Model Checking
Model checking [CGP99] is an automated formal method that systematically explores behaviour
of a system against given specifications. The technology is widely used in practice, including in
the verification of reactive systems, distributed systems, and multi-agent systems [BFPW03,
PL03, RL07]. It received much attention with the presentation of the 2007 Turing Award to E.
M. Clarke, E. A. Emerson and J. Sifakis for their achievements in this area.
In model checking, a system S is described as a mathematical model Ms, and a property P
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is formulated as a formula ϕp in some modal logic. The model checking problem then amounts to
establishing whether the model MS satisfies the formula ϕp, formally MS |= ϕp. Model checking
is seen to have several advantages over other approaches [Cla08], such as testing or theorem
proving: it can be very efficient; it does not require correctness proofs; it may handle partial
specifications; it is fully automatic; and it may show counterexamples.
In this section we give the framework for reasoning about the temporal evolution of artifact
systems and the knowledge of the agents. We define the syntax and semantics of the CTLK
modal logic, give the standard labelling algorithm for this logic and discuss how its fixed-point
characterisation relates to the µ-calculus. We introduce symbolic model checking and describe
how Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs) can be used to tackle the state explosion problem.
Finally, we present predicate abstraction as a key technique to overcome the difficulty of
verifying infinite state spaces.
2.2.1 Artifact-Centric Multi-Agent Systems
In model checking, a system under analysis is represented by a mathematical model that serves
as a semantic structure to interpret the modal logic of interest. This is typically a Kripke
structure [Kri59], a transition system [CES86], or an interpreted system [PR85, FHMV95].
Interpreted systems are extensively used in multi-agent systems frameworks to reason about
temporal and epistemic properties of agents. To analyse interactions within a GSM-based
artifact system, we use artifact-centric multi-agent systems (AC-MAS) [BHCDG+13, BLP12a],
a semantics based on interpreted systems.
In an AC-MAS, a set of agents A share an environment E constituted by the artifact system,
i.e., the underlying elements of the environment are evolving artifacts of type R. Note that the
notion of environment corresponds to different entities in GSM programs and AC-MAS. The
artifact system in a GSM program is mapped into the environment of AC-MAS, while actors
in the environment of the system, which are not formally specified, are mapped to agents in
AC-MAS.
The environment E and an agent i ∈ A have local states LE and Li respectively. The agent
can observe parts of the environment’s local state, i.e., some of the artifact instances in it. The
local state of an agent thus comprises private data for the agent and observable aspects of the
artifact system. We write lE(s) to represent the local state of the environment in the global
state s, and li(s) to represent the local state of agent i.
Interactions between the artifact system and its environment are modelled using actions.
An agent i and the environment E communicate by synchronisation on actions, where ActE
corresponds to events enabled by the artifact system, and Acti ⊆ ActE ∪ {skip} is the set of
local actions corresponding to events that can be executed by the agent and the idle action skip.
Note that we use the notions of action and event interchangeably in the rest of the thesis.
As in plain interpreted systems, protocols are used to select the actions performed in a given
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state, where PE : LE → 2ActE is the environment’s protocol function, which enables executable
events depending on the local state of the artifact system and Pi : Li → 2Acti is the local protocol
function of agent i. These definitions may enable more than one action for a given local state,
in which case the agent selects non-deterministically which action to perform. The environment
and an agent are formally defined as follows:
Definition 5 (Environment). The environment represents an artifact system AS and is formu-
lated as a tuple E = 〈LE, ActE, PE〉, where
• LE is the set of local states,
• ActE is the set of local actions, which correspond to the interface of the AS, and
• PE : LE → 2ActE is the environment’s protocol function, which enables actions that can be
performed depending on the local state of the AS.
Definition 6 (Agent). An agent in an AS is a tuple i = 〈Li, Acti, Pi〉, where
• Li is the set of local states including the observable aspect of the AS;
• Acti is the set of local actions corresponding to events that can be sent by the agent onto
the AS and including an action skip for performing a null action;
• Pi : Li → 2Acti is the local protocol function.
Following the terminology of [BLP12a], we define an AC-MAS as the composition of the
environment and a number of agents as follows:
Definition 7 (AC-MAS). Given an environment E, a set A of agents, and a set AP of atomic
propositions, an artifact-centric multi-agent system is a tuple P = 〈S, I, Act, τ,Λ〉, where
• S ⊆ LE × L1 × · · · × Ln is the set of reachable global states,
• I is the initial state,
• Act = ActE × Act1 × · · · × Actn is the set of joint actions,
• τ : S × Act→ 2S is the global transition function, where the transition τ(s, α) is defined
for α = (aE, a1, . . . , an) if and only if aE ∈ PE(lE(s)), and ∃0≤i<n : ai ∈ Pi(li(s)),
aE = ai ∧ ∀j 6=i : aj = skip.
• Λ : S → 2AP is the evaluation function for propositions.
Intuitively, the conditions on the transition relation limit the communication between the
agents and the environment such that the environment and an agent agree on the same action.
The environment enables actions when the artifact system is ready to consume them, while the
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agent i decides on the actions to execute depending on a local strategy encoded in Pi. Only one
agent can interact with the environment at a time while the others are idle.
We write s → s′ if and only if there exists an action α, such that s′ ∈ τ(s, α), and call s′
the successor of s. A run r from s is an infinite sequence s0 → s1 → . . . with s0 = s. It gives a
description of how the system evolves over time. We write r[i] for the i-th state in the run and
rs for the set of all runs starting from s. A state s
′ is reachable from s if there is a run from s
that contains s′.
In line with the semantics of epistemic logic [FHMV95], we define the knowledge of an agent
by means of relations over global states. We say that the states s and s′ are epistemically
indistinguishable for agent i, or ∼i, if and only if li(s) = li(s′). Note that ∼i is an equivalence
relation, i.e., it is reflexive, symmetric and transitive.
2.2.2 Temporal-Epistemic Logic CTLK
We are interested in specifying temporal-epistemic properties of agents interacting with the
artifact system, as well as of the system itself. The following list contains some of the most
widely used temporal properties in software verification [BK08]:
Reachability properties state that there exists a computation path in a system from its initial
state to a particular state of interest. Reachability properties are the most basic properties
arising in verification, yet they are not expressible in predicate logic [HR04].
Safety properties assert that the system always stays within some allowed bounds, i.e., the
system never reaches a particular undesirable state. Example: No two processes can be in
the critical section at the same time. Safety properties are the most common properties in
practical applications and can be checked using reachability analysis [KV01].
Liveness properties require that some progress happens in the system, i.e., a certain desirable
state is eventually attained. Example: Every request is eventually granted. Many of other
properties can be expressed as a combination of liveness and safety [AS87].
Fairness properties eliminate unrealistic infinite behaviours of the system. They restrict
attention to computations that visit a desirable state infinitely often. Example: The
channel will be open infinitely often. Fairness is often necessary to establish liveness
properties [GPSS80].
We now consider a short example from [FHMV95] to illustrate useful epistemic properties.
In the Bit Transmission Problem (BTP), first introduced in [HZ92], a sender and a receiver
communicate through an unreliable channel that may drop messages. To achieve communication,
the sender starts sending a bit, and continues until it receives an acknowledgement from the
receiver, who does nothing until it receives the bit and then starts sending acknowledgements
back. The acknowledgement effectively carries information about the knowledge state of the
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receiver. We can state the following epistemic property: If an acknowledgement was received,
then the sender knows that the receiver knows the value of the bit.
To specify such properties, we define a subset of first-order temporal-epistemic logic that
supports quantification over the artifact instances in Section 3.4.1. The logic extends Computa-
tion Tree Logic of Knowledge [PL03], or CTLK, which we introduce here. CTLK is a fusion
of CTL [BAPM83], a branching-time logic that allows to express properties about execution
paths of a system, and the n-dimensional modal system S5n [LL32] with n knowledge operators
K1≤i≤n. The syntax of a CTLK formula ϕ is given as follows:
ϕ ::= > | p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | EXϕ | EGϕ | E(ϕUϕ) | Kiϕ
where p ∈ AP is an atomic proposition and i ∈ A is an agent. The above set of temporal CTL
operators is adequate and the remaining operators can be constructed by using de Morgan rules:
EFϕ ≡ E(>Uϕ) AXϕ ≡ ¬EX¬ϕ
AFϕ ≡ ¬EG¬ϕ AGϕ ≡ ¬EF¬ϕ
A(ϕUψ) ≡ ¬(E(¬ψU(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ)) ∨ EG¬ψ)
The defined operators have the following meaning. EXϕ: there exists a next state in which
ϕ holds; EFϕ: there exists a path along which ϕ holds in some future state; EGϕ: there exists
a path along which ϕ holds in all future states ; E(ϕUψ): there exits a path along which ϕ holds
until ψ holds; AXϕ: ϕ holds in all next states; AFϕ: ϕ holds in some future state along all
paths ; AGϕ: ϕ holds in all future states along all paths ; A(ϕUψ):ϕ holds until ψ holds along all
paths ; Kiϕ: agent i knows ϕ.
We inductively define the semantics of CTLK over an AC-MAS P as follows [PL03]. A
formula ϕ is true in a state s of P , written (P , s) |= ϕ, if and only if:
(P , s) |= >
(P , s) |= p iff p ∈ Λ(s)
(P , s) |= ¬ϕ iff it is not the case that (P , s) |= ϕ
(P , s) |= ϕ ∨ ψ iff (P , s) |= ϕ or (P , s) |= ψ
(P , s) |= EXϕ iff exists s′ : s→ s′ and (P , s′) |= ϕ
(P , s) |= EGϕ iff exists r ∈ rs : for all i ≥ 0 : (P , r[i]) |= ϕ
(P , s) |= E(ϕUψ) iff exists r ∈ rs : exists k ≥ 0 : (P , r[k]) |= ψ and
for all j < k(P , r[j]) |= ϕ
(P , s) |= Kiϕ iff for all s′ ∈ S : s ∼i s′ implies (P , s′) |= ϕ
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Note that the above semantics provides an information-theoretic definition of knowledge,
i.e., Ki expresses what agent i can infer from the information available to him. An agent knows
that ϕ is true in state s if ϕ is true in all states s′, which the agent cannot distinguish from s.
This means the agent does not need to build a knowledge base, from which he can deduce new
information, since he already knows everything he could possibly deduce in a certain situation.
To give more intuition, we specify in CTLK some of the properties mentioned above. The
epistemic property mentioned in the BTP can be specified as AG(ϕA → KS(KRϕ0 ∨KRϕ1)),
where KS and KR are epistemic modalities of the sender and the receiver, and ϕA, ϕ0, and ϕ1
stand for receiving the acknowledgement, bit 0, and bit 1. We can express simple reachability
and invariant safety properties using formulas EFϕ and AGϕ respectively. We specify reactivity,
the liveness property from the example, as AG(ϕ → AFψ). Fairness, however, cannot be
expressed in CTL in general. Consider, for instance, a channel does not lose messages forever.
We need to change the semantics by imposing fairness constraints on top of the system, which
ignore unfair computation paths.
2.2.3 Model Checking CTLK
The model checking problem [CGP99] concerns establishing whether a model M for a system S
satisfies a formula ϕ, representing a property P . This can be formally written as:
M |= ϕ
In the context of our formal framework, an AC-MAS model P satisfies a CTLK formula ϕ if
(P , I) |= ϕ. Intuitively this means that the model P satisfies the formula ϕ if ϕ holds in the
initial state of P .
In practice, model checking CTLK is carried out by computing the set of all the states in
which a CTLK formula ϕ holds using the transition and epistemic relations. If the set contains
the set of all initial states I then the formula is true in the model and false otherwise. This
procedure is called a labelling algorithm because it “labels” states where ϕ holds. Algorithm 1
presents the labelling function SAT. It works recursively on the structure of a CTLK formula ϕ
and returns the set of states JϕK satisfying the formula. Here we follow [HR04] for the verification
of the temporal fragment of CTLK, whilst the epistemic case has been introduced in [RL07].
The algorithm generates the Boolean cases directly and calls Algorithms 2, 3, and 4 for
temporal cases and Algorithm 5 for the epistemic case, where variables W , X, Y , and Z
represent sets of states. The function pre∃(X) is instrumental for the evaluation of EX, EG,
and EU formulas and has the following definition:
pre∃(X) = {s ∈ S | exists s′ : s→ s′ and s′ ∈ X}
The function computes the pre-image of set of states X. This is the set of states from which
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Algorithm 1 SATCTLK(ϕ)
1: if ϕ is > then
2: return S
3: else if ϕ is p ∈ Λ then
4: return {s | p ∈ Λ(s)}
5: else if ϕ is ¬ϕ1 then
6: return S \ SATCTLK(ϕ1)
7: else if ϕ is ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 then
8: return SATCTLK(ϕ1) ∪ SATCTLK(ϕ2)
9: else if ϕ is EXϕ1 then
10: return SATCTLK,EX(ϕ1)
11: else if ϕ is EGϕ1 then
12: return SATCTLK,EG(ϕ1)
13: else if ϕ is E[ϕ1Uϕ2] then
14: return SATCTLK,EU(ϕ1, ϕ2)
15: else if ϕ is Kiϕ1 then
16: return SATCTLK,K(ϕ1, i)
17: end if
Algorithm 2 SATCTLK,EX(ϕ)
1: X ← SATCTLK(ϕ)
2: Y ← pre∃(X)
3: return Y
Algorithm 3 SATCTLK,EG(ϕ)
1: X ← SATCTLK(ϕ), Y ← S, Z ← ∅
2: while Z 6= Y do
3: Z ← Y
4: Y ← X ∩ pre∃(Y )
5: end while
6: return Y
Algorithm 4 SATCTLK,EU(ϕ1, ϕ2)
1: W ← S, X ← SATCTLK(ϕ1), Y ← SATCTLK(ϕ2), Z ← ∅
2: while Z 6= W do
3: W ← Z
4: Z ← Y ∪ (X ∩ pre∃(Z))
5: end while
6: return Z
Algorithm 5 SATCTLK,K(ϕ, i)
1: X ← SATCTLK(¬ϕ)
2: Y ← {s ∈ R | exists s′ ∈ X : s ∼i s′}
3: return ¬Y ∩R
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a transition is enabled to a state in X. “Pre” intuitively means moving backwards along the
transition relation τ . Algorithms for EG and EU involve iteration until the respective sets
stabilise and the termination and correctness of the procedures are not obvious. We will discuss
these issues in the next section.
The epistemic case outlined in Algorithm 5 is computed similarly to the EX algorithm with
two notable differences. Firstly, we use the epistemic possibility relation ∼i, rather than the
temporal transition relation. Secondly, we restrict the evaluation only to the set of reachable
states R ⊆ S. This is because a non-reachable state s′ does not exist and cannot be included
in the set of epistemically indistinguishable states of a reachable state s for agent i. The set
R needs to be determined before evaluating any epistemic formula. It can be generated by
iteratively adding to the current set X the set of states reachable from X in a single step,
starting from the set of initial states I:
ρ(X) = X ∪ {s ∈ S | exists s′ : s→ s and s′ ∈ X}
2.2.4 Fixed-point Characterisation of CTLK and µ-Calculus
We now show the termination and correctness of the labelling Algorithm 1 using the so-called
fixed-point characterisation of CTLK and discuss how this semantics relates to the modal
µ-calculus. We use the theory presented here in developing the 3-Valued Abstraction in
Section 4.1.
The fixed-point characterisation of CTLK is grounded in the Knaster-Tarski Theorem [Tar55],
which guarantees the existence of least and greatest fixed points of a monotonic function
f : L → L on the lattice L. Moreover, it also provides a bounded algorithm for calculating
these fixed points. The theorem in its most general form applies to complete lattices. One such
lattice is the power set of a finite set of states under the subset inclusion.
Definition 8 (Monotonic Function). A function f : ℘(S) → ℘(S) on the power set of S is
called monotonic, iff for all X, Y ⊆ S, X ⊆ Y implies f(X) ⊆ f(Y ).
A fixed point of a monotonic function f : ℘(S) → ℘(S) on the power set of S is a subset
X of S that is mapped to itself by the function f , written f(X) = X. Intuitively, the least
fixed point is the fixed point which is the subset of all other fixed points of the functionf , and
the greatest fixed point is the fixed point which is the superset of all other fixed points of the
function f .
We now introduce a more specialised version of the fundamental Knaster-Tarski Theorem
formulated for partially ordered sets [HR04].
Theorem 1 (Knaster-Tarski). Let S be a set {s0, s1, . . . , sn} of n+ 1 elements and f 0(X) = X;
f i+1(X) = f(f i(X)). If f : ℘(S) → ℘(S) is a monotonic function, then fn+1(∅) is the least
fixed point of f and fn+1(S) is the greatest fixed point of f .
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Using the Knaster-Tarski Theorem, we can prove the termination and the correctness of the
labelling function for the minimal set of CTLK operators. Here we again follow [HR04, RL07]
for the definition of the satisfaction of the temporal and epistemic fragments of CTLK. Recall
that the SAT algorithm returns the set of states JϕK satisfying the formula ϕ. For the truth >,
propositional atom p, negation ¬ϕ, and disjunction ϕ ∨ ψ, the respective sets J>K, JpK, J¬ϕK,
and Jϕ ∨ ψK have straightforward formal definitions:
J>K = S J¬ϕK = {s | s /∈ JϕK}JpK = {s | p ∈ Λ(s)} Jϕ ∨ ψK = JϕK ∪ JψK
The correctness of these definitions and the computation of the sets can be easily derived
from the semantics of CTLK. More interesting cases arise when we deal with a formula involving
temporal operators. For the operator EX, we define the set JEXϕK as the set of all states which
have a transition into a state in JϕK. In the previous section we called this set the pre-image
of JϕK. The definition is consistent with the semantics of (P , s) |= EXϕ iff there exists s′ ∈ S,
such that s→ s′ and (P , s′) |= ϕ:
JEXϕK = pre∃(JϕK) = {s ∈ S | exists s′ : s→ s′ and s′ ∈ JϕK}
The set JEGϕK for the operator EG is computed as the greatest fixed point of states
that satisfy ϕ and can proceed to a state that satisfies ϕ as well. More specifically, starting
with the set of all states S, we take the intersection of the pre-image of this set and JϕK and
repeat the operation until we reach the greatest fixed point. This leads to the equivalence
EGϕ ≡ ϕ ∧ EXEGϕ. Using the pre-image notation above, we can define the set JEGϕK as:
JEGϕK = JϕK ∩ pre∃(JEGϕK)
The definition of the temporal transition relation τ guarantees the monotonicity of the
function f(X) = JϕK ∩ pre∃(X). Given that the set of states S is finite, the set JEGϕK can be
computed as the greatest fixed point fn+1(S), where n is the number of states in S.
Similarly, the set JE(ϕUψ)K for the operator EU is computed as the least fixed point of
states that satisfy ϕ and can transition to a state that satisfies either ϕ or ψ. However, this
time we start from the empty set, take the intersection of its pre-image, which is the empty set
again, and JϕK and then we combine the result with JψK by taking the union of the two sets.
We repeat the procedure until we reach the least fixed point:
JE(ϕUψ)K = JψK ∪ (JϕK ∩ pre∃(JE(ϕUψ)K))
The same argument about termination and correctness applies to this algorithm. Finally, we
consider the epistemic operator Ki. We define the set JKiϕK as the set of all states, such that
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all their indistinguishable states are in JϕK, restricted to the set of reachable states R:
JKiϕK = {s ∈ R | for all s′ ∈ R : s ∼ s′ implies s′ ∈ JϕK}
Observe that this, in fact, defines the pre-image pre∀(X) of the set JϕK with respect to the
epistemic possibility relation ∼i. Using the set complementation and the pre-image pre∃(X),
we can express the set JKiϕK as:
JKiϕK = pre∀(JϕK) = R/pre∃(R/JϕK)
We now introduce the modal µ-calculus [Koz83] and investigate its relationship to the
temporal fragment of CTLK. The µ-calculus is a powerful formalism for expressing properties of
transition systems using fixed-point operators. It subsumes most modal and temporal logics of
programs, including CTL, LTL [Pnu77], and CTL* [EH86]. A great advantage of the modal µ-
calculus is that it provides an expressive, elegant, and uniform logical framework with semantics
firmly anchored in the Knaster-Tarski Theorem. However, as we will see, specifications written
in logics such as CTL are usually more understandable than specifications written directly in
the µ-calculus.
The syntax of a µ-calculus formula ϕ is defined in BNF notation as follows [Len05]. Let AP
be a finite set of atomic propositions and V a set of propositional variables, then
ϕ ::= > | p | Z | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 3ϕ | 2ϕ | µZ.ϕ | νZ.ϕ
where p ∈ AP and Z ∈ V . The operators 3 and 2 are the usual modal operators of possibility
and necessity. The syntactic combinations µZ and νZ are the least and greatest fix-point
operators respectively. Additionally, an environment ρ : V → 2S interprets the free propositional
variable Z as a set of states. Any occurrence of Z in ϕ falls within an even number of negations.
We also assume that formulas are closed and well-named, i.e., all propositional variables are
bound exactly once in any formula.
An important concept is the alternation depth of a µ-calculus formula, which reflects the
number of nested µ and ν fixed points that need to be computed in order to verify the formula.
This measure depends on the syntactic structure of the formula and has implications for the
complexity of model checking. The translation of most logics requires only a small fragment
of the µ-calculus. Significantly, CTL can be translated to an alternation free fragment of
the µ-calculus. Using the fixed-point characterisation of CTL, we can define a syntactically
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monotonic function T , which produces closed µ-calculus formulas, as follows [Len05]:
T (>) = > T (EXϕ) = 3T (ϕ)
T (p) = p T (EGϕ) = νZ.(T (ϕ) ∧3Z)
T (¬ϕ) = ¬T (ϕ) T (EϕUψ) = µZ.(T (ψ) ∨ (T (ϕ) ∧3Z))
T (ϕ ∨ ψ) = T (ϕ) ∨ T (ψ)
We can now formulate the sets JEGϕK and JEUϕK for CTL operators EG and EU as fixed
points in the µ-calculus notation:
JEGϕK = νZ.JϕK ∩ EX ZJE(ϕUψ)K = µZ.JψK ∪ (JϕK ∩ EX Z)
We finish this section with a brief discussion on the expressiveness of CTL. Recall we
mentioned in the previous section that fairness properties cannot be specified in CTL. This
is because neither weak nor strong fairness can be expressed by a µ-calculus formula with
alternation depth 1. In fact, it has been shown that such properties require alternation depth
2 [Eme97]. For instance, the channel will be open infinitely often can be specified by the
µ-calculus formula
νY.µZ.3(c ∧ Y ∨ Z),
where c stands for the channel is open. Notice that here the fixed points ν and µ alternate.
2.2.5 BDD-Based Symbolic Model Checking
It has been shown in [LR06] that model checking CTLK is a P-complete problem. Indeed, by
analysing the fixed-point labelling algorithm, we can derive its complexity as O(|ϕ| × (|S|+ τ)),
where |ϕ| is the size of the formula ϕ, |S| is the number of states in the model P and τ is the
number of possible transitions in the model P . The algorithm thus runs in linear time both in
the size of the formula and the size of the model. However, for concurrent systems the size of
the model itself can be exponential in the number components of the system. The complexity of
model checking CTLK in these settings has been shown to be PSPACE-complete [LR06]. This
exponential growth of the state space is known as the state explosion problem.
The labelling algorithm described in Section 2.2.3 was originally implemented using explicit
state representation [Eme97]. As the name suggests, in the explicit state representation, each
state and transition is represented explicitly. Standard data structures, such as adjacency lists
and adjacency matrices, are used to model the system. Due to the combinatorial state explosion,
it can quickly become practically impossible to represent the state space of the model using
these data structures even for a relatively small system.
More efficient data structures are needed to overcome the state explosion problem. These
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Figure 2.5: Binary decision tree and OBDDs for the function f .
Table 2.2: Truth table for function f .
x1 x2 y1 y2 f x1 x2 y1 y2 f
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1
0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
data structures model the system implicitly using symbolic state representation. Typically,
the data structures involved in symbolic model checking [BCM+90] are the Binary Decision
Diagrams [Bry86]. BDDs can succinctly encode and efficiently manipulate Boolean functions
representing large sets of states and the transitions between them. Note that conceptually
there is no difference between explicit and symbolic state representations and the same fixed-
point model checking algorithm can be used to evaluate the validity of a formula. It is the
implementation where BDDs made a major practical breakthrough [Eme97].
A BDD is a compact representation of a binary tree for some Boolean function [HR04].
We briefly demonstrate the concept on an example. Table 2.2 presents the truth table of the
Boolean function f(x1, x2, y1, y2)
def
= (x1∧y1)∨(x2∧y2), where x1, x2, y1, y2 ∈ {0, 1}. Figure 2.5a
illustrates the binary tree associated to the truth table of the function f . The non-terminal
nodes represent a Boolean variable and the terminal nodes represent the value of the Boolean
function. The values 0 and 1 of the Boolean variables correspond to the dashed and solid edges,
respectively.
Figures 2.5b and 2.5c then show two ordered BDDs. An ordered BDD, or OBDD, is a BDD
in which the Boolean variables appear in some predetermined fixed order along all paths of the
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diagram. As we can see in Figure 2.5, the variable ordering has a huge impact on the size of the
data structure and is of the utmost importance to practical applications. However, the problem
of finding the optimal variable ordering is NP-hard [HR04].
2.2.6 Encoding AC-MAS in OBDDs
We now describe how an AC-MAS P can be encoded using OBDDs. The number of Boolean
variables required to encode the set of local states Li of agent i is nv(i) = dlog2 |Li|e. This
means that a global state s can be represented with a vector of Boolean variables of length
N =
∑
i∈A nv(i) as follows:
s =⇒ (x1, . . . , xnv(1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
L1
, . . . , xj, . . . , xnv(k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Lk
, . . . , xN)
Similarly, the number of Boolean variables required to encode the set of actions Acti of agent
i is na(i) = dlog2 |Acti|e. This means that a joint action α can be associated with a Boolean
vector of length M =
∑
i∈A na(i) as follows:
α =⇒ (a1, . . . , aM).
Each vector then can be identified with a Boolean formula in form of a conjunction of literals.
A set of vectors, i.e. a set of global states and actions, is described as a disjunction of the
formulas encoding the vectors. The definition of Boolean formulas encoding protocols fPi of
agents and transition functions fτi capitalise on the Boolean representations of local states and









where bf(Q) is a function that transforms set Q of states or actions into its corresponding
encoding set. The rightmost formula expresses the requirement that a single action has to be
selected in a given local state. The Boolean formula fti representing the transition function is
the disjunction of all possible Boolean functions bf({lp}) ∧ bf({aq} ∧ bf ′({lr})) which encode a
generic pair τi(lp, aq) = lr, where aq ∈ Act and lp, lr ∈ Li. Formulas for the joint protocol fP








Finally, the Boolean function fI associated with the set I of initial global states is defined
as the disjunction of the Boolean formulas representing all global states in I, and the Boolean
function fΛ corresponding to evaluation function Λ is such that fΛ(p) is a Boolean function
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encoding the set of all global state in which p ∈ AP holds.
2.2.7 Predicate Abstraction
Even though OBDDs usually provide a significantly more efficient representation of a system, this
is not always the case. The worse-case complexity is the same as for the explicit representation.
Moreover, as we noted in the previous section, both representations are conceptually the same,
and so infinite-state systems cannot be verified using either, as the model checking of such
systems is undecidable.
To get around these limitation, various abstraction techniques have been proposed to simplify
both finite- and infinite-state systems. Abstraction removes details that are not relevant to
the property under verification. It typically works by clustering states of the concrete system
that satisfy some common properties into so-called abstract states, and by deriving abstract
transition relations between these abstract states. This results in a significant reduction of the
state space. The verification of the obtained abstract system then runs faster and requires less
memory.
The trade-off is that abstraction techniques generally place some limitations on the properties
that can be verified and the conclusions that can be drawn from incomplete abstract model.
On one hand, fewer details in the model can allow for a successful verification of the property,
on the other hand, the loss of information can also result in an inconclusive answer. In some
cases the inconclusive answer can be resolved by a refinement of the abstract model, leading to
a finer-grained abstraction that has just enough information to verify the property.
Different methods specifying how states are clustered and how the transition relation is
acquired give raise to different abstraction approaches with different limitations. One such
abstraction approach is symmetry reduction [ID96], which involves replacing sets of symmetrically
equivalent states in a model by a single representative state from each equivalence class.
Two types of symmetries have been investigated in the context of multi-agent systems, data
symmetries [CDLQ09a] and agent symmetries [CDLQ09b].
One of the most popular techniques is existential abstraction as presented in [CGL94] and
rooted in the foundational work on abstract interpretation [CC77]. In this framework an abstract
model is constructed such that it may contain spurious transitions not present in the concrete
model. We call this behaviour an over-approximation. Nevertheless, the technique preserves
correctness of ACTL* specifications [CGL94], a fragment of CTL* where only the universal
path operator is allowed and the negation is restricted to atomic formulas. An extension of
this technique, known as counter-example guided abstraction refinement (CEGAR) [CGJ+03],
iteratively refines the abstract model by removing spurious transition found in the model.
A more general approach, known as predicate abstraction [GS97, Sa¨ı00], is based on the
clustering of states of the concrete system according to relevant properties satisfied by each
state. The predicates can be obtained by making queries to an automatic theorem prover, a
2.2 model checking | 29
SAT solver, or an SMT solver. Here the abstract models are designed to be conservative with
respect to the usual 2-valued semantics. This means that only true formulas are preserved in the
abstract model, similarly to the existential abstraction. However, we obtain a greater advantage
if we interpret formulas with respect to a 3-valued semantics [BG99]. This semantics evaluates
the formula to either true, false, or unknown, and allows the abstract models to be conservative
for both the true and false formulas, with the result unknown if the abstraction does not contain
enough details.
We now introduce the formal background for 3-valued predicate abstraction. Note that this
is only a brief summary and we provide more details in Section 4.1. Let MC be a concrete
model with a set of concrete states SC . An abstraction (SA, γ) for SC consists of a finite set of
abstract states SA and a total concretisation function γ : SA 7→ 2Sc that maps each abstract
state sa ∈ SA to the non-empty set of concrete states Sc ⊆ SC it represents. Conversely, every
concrete sc ∈ SC is contained in some abstract state sa ∈ SA. The abstract states provide
descriptions of the concrete states.
A class of models consists of a transition system, which is accompanied with a logic defined
over models from the class, and a preservation relation  that ensures preservation of the
logic. An abstract model for MC is then a model MA over SA, in which (MC , sc)  (MA, sa)
whenever sc ∈ γ(sa). Here we consider a class of abstract models called Kripke Modal Transition
System [GJ02, HJS01].
Definition 9 (KMTS). A Kripke Modal Transition System is a tuple M = (S, S0,
may−→, must−→, L),
where S is a finite set of states, S0 ⊆ S is a set of initial states, may−→⊆ S × S and must−→⊆ S × S
are transition relations such that
may−→ is total and must−→⊆ may−→, and L : S → 2AP is a labelling
function such that for every state s and p ∈ AP , at most one of p and ¬p is in L(s).
We now describe how to build an abstract KMTS model MA = (SA, S0A,
may−→, must−→, LA) for a
concrete model MC = (SC , S0C ,→, LC), which is a standard Kripke Structure. The set of initial
abstract states S0A is constructed such that s0a ∈ S0A iff ∃s0c ∈ S0C , such that s0c ∈ γ(s0a).
The biconditional is required in order to preserve both truth and falsity from MA to MC .
The may transitions in an abstract model are computed such that every concrete transition
between two states is represented by them. They over-approximate the concrete transitions and
preserve truth from MA to MC . Formally, there exists a may transition sa
may−→ s′a iff there exist
sc ∈ γ(sa) and s′c ∈ γ(s′a), such that sc −→ s′c. Conversely, the must transitions correspond to
concrete transitions that are common to all of the concrete states represented by the source
abstract state. They under-approximate the concrete transitions and preserve falsity from MA
to MC . There exists a must transition sa
must−→ s′a iff for each sc ∈ γ(sa) there exists s′c ∈ γ(s′a),
such that sc −→ s′c.
The labelling of an abstract state is defined so that it is consistent with the labelling of all
the concrete states it represents, formally l ∈ Lit : l ∈ LA(sa) iff for each sc ∈ γ(sa) we have
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Figure 2.6: Concrete and abstract transitions of a non-negative integer counter.
Figure 2.6 illustrates an abstraction of a simple non-negative integer counter. It consists of
a single integer variable x that is initialised to 0 and gets incremented by 1 at each step. The
abstract states are based on predicates p (x < 3) and q (x = 3). Using the above procedure,
we initialise the abstract counter to the abstract state pq. There are four may transitions
pq
may−→ pq (since there are concrete transition 0→ 1 and 1→ 2), pq may−→ pq (2→ 3), pq may−→ pq
(3 → 4), and pq may−→ pq (4 → 5, . . . ). However, there are only two must transition pq must−→ pq
and pq must−→ pq. There is no must transition starting from abstract state pq since concrete states
0 and 1 have no successor in pq and concrete state 2 has no successor in abstract state pq. Note
that we omit may transitions in the figure if they coincide with a must transition.
The downside of KMTS is that abstraction refinement is not monotonic and can lead to a
less precise abstract models, since a must transition can be lost when an abstract state is split.
To alleviate the problem, in [SG04] the authors proposed Generalised KMTS, in which must
transitions are replaced by must hyper-transitions that connect a single abstract state sa to a
set of abstract states A. The concrete states s′c then can be split into several abstract states,
leading to monotonic abstraction refinement.
This concludes the chapter. Here we introduced basic concepts to support the work presented
in the this thesis. We outlined the theoretical framework for business artifacts with GSM
lifecycles, provided background on symbolic model checking, introduced temporal-epistemic
logic, and briefly covered 3-valued abstraction. We now move to the theoretical foundations of
model checking GSM-based multi-agent systems.
2.3 Overview
We now give a short high-level description of the overall solution described in the following
Chapters. Figure 2.7 describes the internal architecture of the tool for the verification of concrete
artifact systems, while Figure 2.8 depicts the internal architecture of the model checker for the
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Figure 2.7: Architecture of the model checker.
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UnknownFalseTrue
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Figure 2.8: Architecture of the model checker including abstraction.
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verification of abstract artifact systems.
The design in both cases is modular and the workflows consist of several high-level phases
that are firmly anchored in the theoretical contributions of this thesis. The abstraction workflow
follows closely the concrete one with some significant modifications.
The inputs into the model checker consists of the GSM program, the description of roles and
agents, and the properties to be verified. The parsers of the tool transform these inputs into
the internal representation, which is cross-referenced and checked for consistency and semantic
errors.
The next step is the creation of the abstract model from the concrete model if the 3-valued
abstraction is enabled. The model checker implements the SMT-based, 3-valued predicate
abstraction developed in Chapter 4. The predicates of the abstract model are obtained by
making queries to an automatic SMT solver.
Then the PAC rules templates are instantiated to generate the set of ground PAC rules using
the GSM semantics from Section 2.1.2. The ground rules are instantiated for every instance in
the system. The number of possible instances is bound. The dependencies among the ground
PAC rules are analysed and the process fails if the GSM model is not well formed.
Encoding the system into BDDs slightly differs between the verification of concrete and
abstract systems. In the latter case, the temporal changes of the concrete system are reflected
by predicate changes in the abstraction but since these updates may be approximate, we need
to construct may and must transitions. These transitions are computed by queries to an SMT
solver. In both cases BDD variables are allocated to represent the system. The tool then
generates BDD representations of the PAC rules and events and constructs the transition
relations of the artifact system and the agents following the procedure described in Section 3.3.
The transition relations are built only once and reused for the construction of the reachable
state spaces, as well as the evaluation of formulas.
We compute the set of reachable states by alternating transition relations of the agents
and the system. We build the set gradually by applying the transitions on the current set of
reachable states, starting from the initial state, until we reach a fixed point. We construct two
reachable state spaces, may and must, for the abstract model.
Finally, the properties are verified one by one. This is done by building the BDD repre-
sentation of the set of states in which the property holds. If this set contains the initial state,
the property is true in the model and false otherwise. Additionally, in the case of the abstract
model, the result may be unknown.
3 Model Checking
GSM-Based MAS
In this chapter we give a constructive methodology for the practical model checking of GSM-
based multi-agent systems (GSM-MAS). To verify business artifacts from a multi-agent system
perspective, we need a formal framework. To this end, we propose how business artifacts and
agents can be combined to form GSM-MAS and then define a formal map from GSM-MAS
to AC-MAS. Then we give a constructive methodology for creating the transition system. We
describe the construction of the transition relation for the artifact system using rules that
are derived from GSM lifecycle models and provide the transition and epistemic relations of
agents. Finally, we define the model checking problem for AC-MAS against specifications in the
temporal-epistemic logic IQ-CTLK, which supports quantification over artifact instances and
has a limited support for data.
3.1 GSM-Based Multi-Agent Systems
A GSM program by itself only deals with the machinery related to the artifact system but does
not provide a description of the agents interacting with it. In this section we define GSM-based
multi-agent systems as an extension of GSM with a set of external agents and give a formal
mapping f : GSM-MAS → AC-MAS. This allows us to conduct the verification of GSM-MAS
via model checking. We describe the construction of the transition relation and show that f
preserves satisfaction of formulas in the specification language IQ-CTLK later in this chapter.
3.1.1 Agent Description
Here we outline how the agents are specified and interact with a given GSM-based artifact
system, thereby defining a GSM-MAS instance. The artifact system and agents communicate
using events, where the available events for an agent depend on the current state of the artifact
system, as well as of the agent. The system progresses by non-deterministically selecting an
agent, which sends an event and triggers the execution of the artifact system. The selection of
the event and execution of the artifact system are seen as a one-step transition from one stable
state to another. A stable state has no pending events.






Figure 3.1: Static and dynamic visibility in GSM-MAS.
An important aspect of artifact systems is that agents should not be able to access all the
data, nor should they be able to send arbitrary events to artifact instances. The behaviour
of an agent is determined by two key components. Firstly, an authorisation view specifies
the permitted access to the artifact system based on the role of the agent. This concept is
inspired by the abstract i-Hub model [LBH+12, LBH13]. Secondly, private data and the protocol
function, defined for each agent individually, drive local decisions regarding which events the
agent sends to the artifact system.
Definition 10 (Role). A role in a GSM-MAS is a tuple r = 〈ν, ω, 〉, where
• ν is the view for the visible attributes of the artifact system;
• ω is the window for the selection the visible artifact instances;
•  is the set of events that are accepted by the artifact system.
The concepts of ν, ω and  are powerful tools to define the aspects that the agents can see
and the ways they can interact with the artifact system. While ν and  are simple lists, ωi(ι)
is a formula that is evaluated for a specific artifact instance ι and an agent i. The instance is
exposed to the agent only if ωi(ι) evaluates to true.
In Figure 3.1 the lines correspond to artifact instances that were created at run-time and the
columns correspond to data and status attributes. The view ν describes the relationship between
each role and a specific artifact type. It defines a static view of the system, as it puts fixed
restrictions on the data attributes and the portion of the lifecycle phases agents of a particular
role can observe. In contrast, the window ω describes a connection between a role and a specific
instance of an artifact type. It gives a dynamic selection of the parts of the artifact system
an agent can access in terms of the state of artifact instances as it hides complete instances
depending on the current state.
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Table 3.1: Data attributes in view ν of agent roles in Order-to-Cash.
Buyer Seller Carrier
Order ID Order ID Order ID
Product Code Product Code
Quantity Quantity
Buyer ID Buyer ID Buyer ID
Seller ID Seller ID Seller ID
Carrier ID Carrier ID
Parts
Table 3.2: Stages in view ν of agent roles in Order-to-Cash.
Buyer Seller Carrier
Initialization








Definition 11 (Agent). An agent in a GSM-MAS is a tuple i = 〈ri, vi, ℘i〉, where
• ri is the role of the agent;
• vi is the set of local variables with their names, types and initial values;
• ℘i : (ι, vi)→ 2i is the local protocol function.
The protocol determines behaviour of the agent i depending on the observable state of the
artifact system and vi. It gives the set of events e with their respective payloads that can be
sent in the current state to the instance ι. The protocol also gives an update function µi(e, v),
which computes new assignments for the local variables depending on the selected event and
the local state of the agent.
To handle automated tasks, we define an AutoAgent, which handles service calls and compu-
tations in the GSM model Γ and returns the result to the artifact system in form of an event.
The AutoAgent holds pending tasks in a buffer t, has full access to Γ, and can send the return
messages at any time, but is otherwise handled like any other agent. Note that the AutoAgent
is a simplification of the model in the sense that the agents do not carry out tasks completion
themselves. This would require more sophisticated protocols of agents and we wanted to focus
on more fundamental aspects of the system at this stage.
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We illustrate these concepts on the Order-to-Cash example introduced in Section 2.1.3. We
introduce three roles of agents: Buyer, Seller, and Carrier. The Buyer creates an instance of
the order, the Seller manages most of the CustomerOrderProcessing stage, and the delivery of
the ordered product is performed by the Carrier.
Table 3.1 lists data attributes that are added to the view ν of the three roles. Table 3.2
gives restrictions on observable stages and Table 3.3 on observable milestones. The latter two
Tables hide parts of the GSM model Γ. For example, the Buyer can only see that the state of
an order moved from Preparing to Shipping, while the Seller sees more detail. Finally, Table 3.4
lists events from the set of events  that each role can send to the artifact system. For example,
the Buyer is the only one, who can create an instance of the order.
The window ω is defined for each agent of the role Buyer, such that the value of the Buyer
ID attribute is equal to the unique ID of the agent. This effectively restricts access of a Buyer
to its own orders only. Similarly for Sellers and Carriers.
3.1.2 Mapping to AC-MAS
We now establish the formal mapping f : GSM-MAS → AC-MAS from GSM-based multi-agent
systems to artifact-centric multi-agent systems. Note that the semantics for the local states and
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the protocols of the agents in GSM-MAS are given in terms of AC-MAS. We define the map by
constructing the environment 〈LE, ActE, PE〉 from the GSM model Γ of a given artifact system
and creating an agent 〈L0, Act0, P0〉 for the AutoAgent, and 〈Li, Acti, Pi〉 with 1 ≤ i ≤ n for
each external GSM-MAS agent. We identify a GSM event e with an AC-MAS action a and will
omit the conversion in the following for ease of presentation. The sets of actions ActE, Act0, and
Acti are thus directly defined by the events the artifact system provides and the permissions of
the agents.
Global state: To construct a global AC-MAS state (lE, l0, . . . , ln) ∈ S from an snapshot Σ,
an AutoAgent buffer t and the local agent states vi, we identify lE with Σ and l0 with t. The
local states l1, . . . , ln of the external agent comprise the state of the private variables vi and the
projections Σ|i of the environment snapshot such that:
Σ|i = {ι | ∃ι′∈Σ : ωi(ι′) ∧ ι = ι′|νi}
where ι′|νi is the restriction of the artifact instance ι
′ to the variables in νi (variables not in νi
are replaced by ⊥).
The initial state I is the empty state without any artifact instances in Σ or pending tasks
in l0. This is because in a real system we start from an empty database. Private variables are
initialised to their initial value.
Protocol: By construction, GSM executes only events that can trigger an applicable sentry,
that is, a sentry with both the prerequisite and the antecedent satisfiable in the current state.
Artifact instantiation events are always permitted. Given this, we define the environment
protocol PE as:
PE(Σ) = {a | ∃ι∈Σ : (χ ∈ X(Γ) ∧ χ(ι, a)) ∨ a ∈ inst}
where X(Γ) is the set of all sentries in the milestones and guards of Γ and χ(ι, a) is the evaluation
of a sentry χ with respect to the action a and data and status attributes Att ∈ ι. We write inst
for the set of artifact instantiation events. The AutoAgent stores the set of pending tasks in its
buffer t and sends them at a later point to Γ. Thus, the protocol simply selects any pending
task from its buffer by using the expression P0(t) = {a|a ∈ t}. The protocol of an agent i gives
the set of actions that are available in visible instances of its local state and satisfy its local
protocol:
Pi(li) = {a | ∃ι∈li : a ∈ i(ι) ∩ ℘i(ι, vi)}
Transition Function: Recall that the transition function τ((lE, l0, . . . , ln), aE, a0, . . . , an) in
AC-MAS is defined iff aE ∈ P (lE) and ∀0≤i≤n : ai ∈ P (li). Thus, using the above definitions,


























































Figure 3.2: BDD layout of GSM-MAS.
we instantiate the transition function as follows:
τ((Σ,l0, l1, . . . , ln), aE, a0, a1, . . . , an) = {(Σ′, l′0, l′1, . . . , l′n) | (Σ′, gen) = δ(Σ, a)
∧ a = aE = ai ∧ ∀j 6=i : aj = skip ∧ l′0 = (l0 ∪ (gen)) \ a ∧ ∀1≤i≤nl′i = Σ′|i ∩ µi(ai, vi)}
These components suffice to instantiate a full AC-MAS from Definition 7. With these details
in place we conclude the formal map from GSM-MAS to AC-MAS. In the remainder of the
chapter we present a practical methodology for model checking AC-MAS against IQ-CTLK
specifications.
3.2 BDD Encoding
We need to make some design choices to be able to practically verify AC-MAS against IQ-CTLK
specifications using OBDDs. This means we simplify the model whilst preserving as many
system behaviour as possible. To create a finite symbolic representation, we introduce abound
on the number of instances that can be generated and use data abstraction to create finite data.
This is achieved by the reduction of data attributes to simpler data types, specifically, Boolean
variables, enumerations, and bounded integers.
The basic layout of the BDD data structure is shown in Figure 3.2. Overflow is a flag that
indicates if the bound for the data abstractions and artifact instances was exceeded by any
run, in which case some of the results of the check may be unsound. Event ID and Payload
correspond to the next event e that is to be executed and its payload. These are represented by
vectors BDD variables e and p respectively.
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The artifact instances correspond to Σ, represented by the BDD vector x and have a special
named status attribute Created. The actual number and size of these fields depend on the
artifact type and the bounds that are fixed at the start of the verification. The model does not
limit the number of artifact types in the system and the instance bound is enforced on a per
type basis. The Created flag is used to distinguish active instances and is set to true when a
corresponding instantiation event is received and the attributes are initiated.
The task buffer fields t with a Pending flag and the corresponding payload belong conceptually
to the AutoAgent, but are stored in the main artifact state space for technical reasons. Pending
tasks are represented by the BDD vector t. Finally, private variables of agents, represented by
the BDD vector v complete the data structure. Note that unlike the task buffer, the private
storage of agents does not depend on the number of instances. This simplification makes the
modelling of agents easier, however, it means that agents cannot hold data related to individual
instances. The limitation can be lifted without much of an impact on the verification.
In the following, we will refer to unprimed and primed variables as current and next state
variables, respectively, and use set representation and the representation as Boolean formula
interchangeably. Rather then exploring single traces of a system, a symbolic model checker
represents sets of states and computes the image of a full set of states in one step rather then
by iterating all possible paths. In set notation, the computation of the image of a set of states x
for a transition relation δ ⊆ X ×X ′ is given by:
image(x) = {x′ | (x, x′) ∈ δ}
Instead of directly reasoning over set of states, the implementation uses Boolean formulas to
represent sets and Boolean operations, quantification and renaming to implement operations on
them. To compute the image operations using Boolean formulas we encode x using a set of
Boolean variables (written as x(xf )) and x
′ as x′(xf ′) and construct a formula δf in xf and xf ′
which is true exactly when (x, x′) ∈ δ. The computation of the image is now given by:
image(x(xf )) = (∃xf : x(xf ) ∧ δ(xf , xf ′))[xf/xf ′]
where first we restrict the solutions of δf to the evaluations that fix xf to x(xf ), then remove xf
from the resulting formula by existential quantification and finally rename all variables in xf
′ by
the corresponding variables in xf . BDDs provide effective implementations for these operations.
Note that because of multiple instances in the data structure Boolean formulas are instantiated
with the BDD variables of the corresponding artifact instance ι. For instance, we write ωiι for
the window function of agent i, which is called with the values from ι, while ωi(ι) represents
the formula using the variables corresponding to ι.
40 | model checking gsm-based mas
3.3 Transition Relation of GSM-Based Artifact Systems
To verify the behaviour of a GSM-based artifact system, we transform the system into a finite-
state machine and systematically examine all its possible behaviours. We define the transition
relation of the artifact system, which is represented in AC-MAS by the environment E, as
follows:
δE(e,Σ, t, V ) = {(∅,Σ′, t′, V ) | (Σ′, gen) = δ(Σ, e) ∧ e ∈ ℘(Σ) ∧ t′ = t ∪ gen}
where δ(Σ, e) is the B-step defined in Section 2.1.2, t is the buffer of pending tasks, and V is
the set of all local variables.
As noted previously, the incremental semantics of GSM is not directly amenable to symbolic
model checking as it does not provide a transition system. Instead, we construct a B-step from
a number of micro-steps using the incremental semantics of GSM described in Section 2.1.2. We
apply changes in a sequence of updates until a fixed point is reached. Reaching of the fixed point
is guaranteed as there are finitely many rules that have no circular dependency. Developing
a transition relation from this declarative semantics requires further analysis of the process
performing a B-step. We divide the generation of a new snapshot into three phases illustrated
in Figure 3.3:
• Processing incoming events 1 : Each B-step processes one event that is selected from a
set of pending events. The execution of the event may cause updates to the local data
or perform structural actions like creating a new instance of an artifact. This phase
corresponds to the the immediate effect of the event.
• Application of PAC rules 2 : Effects from 1 may change the conditions of guards or
milestones and thus trigger a PAC rule that updates the status attributes or issues events.
These changes may lead to the execution of further PAC rules, resulting in a sequence of
rule executions.
• Sending new events 3 : To finalise a B-step, the executed event is removed from the set
of pending events, and newly raised events from the PAC rule executions are added.
In the remainder of this section we show how to generate an AC-MAS transition system that
corresponds to a given GSM-based artifact system by computing the transition relation δE from
the three phases given above.
Using the encoding above, we define the transition relation as set of tuples δ ⊆ Σ × Σ of
start- and end-states for all possible B-steps. Alternatively, we also represent δ symbolically
as Boolean function that evaluates to true for all (x e, x′ e′) ∈ δ. This expression is easily built
by computing the disjunction of all tuples in the set. The Boolean representation allows us to
compute the successors for a set of states Σˆ in one step by 1) building the conjunction with the












Figure 3.3: B-steps and micro steps of GSM.
transition relation δ and 2) removing the current state variables and replace them by the next
states: δ(Σˆ) = (∃x eΣˆ ∧ δ)[x e/x′e′].
To build δ, we first construct the transition relations δ 1 , δ 2 , and δ 3 for the different phases
and then concatenate them into δE = δ 1 ◦ δ 2 ◦ δ 3 . The concatenation of transition relations
is done similarly to the computation of the image described in the previous section, but it
requires the introduction of an intermediate state; in this case it necessitates the conversion
between snapshots and pre-snapshots. In the following we use the set representation and the
functional representation interchangeably when the meaning is clear from the context. Also, we
omit private variables of agents since the B-step keeps these constant.
3.3.1 Execution of an Event
Phase 1 generates the first pre-snapshot from a snapshot Σ by consuming a pending event
e and assigning the result of its execution to the attributes x′. The effect of a single event e
is given by δe below, where e = e states that variables e encode the pending event e, e(p, x)
returns the results of executing e using the current data.






¬p′j ∧ (x′ = e(p, x)) ∧ (t′ = t)}
The event e changes attributes according to its type E, the current values of x, and the
payload p. The initialisation event is executed by initialising the data of a corresponding artifact
type and setting its Created flag to true. In a snapshot with several pending events one of them






The resulting transition relation produces all possible initial pre-snapshots Σ1 for any set of
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snapshots Σ.
3.3.2 Execution of the PAC Rules
The main challenge in computing the updates to status attributes within a B-step is the inter-
dependency of the PAC rules. This leads to different sequences of pre-snapshots depending on
the executed event and the state of the system. The key property of the semantics that enables
us to combine the different steps in 2 into a single transition relation is the requirement that
dependencies among PAC rules are not circular, i.e., that no consequent of a rule changes the
variables needed in an antecedent of an earlier one. This allows us to find a single order of PAC
rules that covers all permitted sequences of micro-steps. The transitions for PAC rules that are
not applicable for a certain state are implemented such that all attributes are kept constant.
The order is computed using the dependency graph DG(Γ) before computing the transition
relation.
To incorporate the changes in the pre-snapshot that are introduced by a PAC rule i, we
have to take into account the prerequisite (P), the antecedent (A), and the consequent (C). The
prerequisite checks a value on the last snapshot Σ. The antecedent is an expression over Σ and
the next snapshot Σ′. The antecedents of the PAC-1, PAC-2, and PAC-3 rules are taken from
the conditions of guards and milestones, while all others are determined by the abstract PAC
rule templates.
Recall from Section 2.1.2, though, that the ordering of the PAC rules ensures that none of
the variables in A is changed during or after execution of the current rule, which allows us to
operate on Σ and the pre-snapshot Σi. If A matches, the consequent updates the values for the
next pre-snapshot while the values not touched by C remain as in Σi.
We instantiate the abstract PAC rule templates from Table 2.1 to model specific ground
PAC rules [HDDM+11]. In the following, we use s, s′ and s′′ to encode the active flag of the
corresponding stage for the previous snapshot, the current micro step and the next snapshot
respectively. Similarly, m, m′ and m′′ are used for the corresponding milestone.
PAC-1 is instantiated for every guard in the model to activate the corresponding stage when
the guard is fulfilled. The antecedent is taken from the condition of the guard. The
prerequisite is encoded as Pri = ¬s (stage was not open in the last snapshot) and the
consequent as Cri = s
′′ (stage will be enabled in the next snapshot). We construct one
ground rule of this type for every guard in the model.
PAC-2 is instantiated for every achieving sentry of every milestone in the model. We use the
sentry as the antecedent, encode the prerequisite as Pri = s (the stage was already open
in the last snapshot), and the consequent as Cri = m
′′ (the milestone achieved in the next
snapshot). We construct one ground rule of this type for every achieving sentry of every
milestone in the model.
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PAC-3 is instantiated for every invalidating sentry of every milestone in the model. Again, the
sentry is used as antecedent and we use m, m′ and m′′ to represent the active flag of the
milestone. We encode the prerequisite asPri = m and the consequent as Cri = ¬m′′. We
construct one ground rule of this type for every invalidating sentry of every milestone in
the model.
PAC-4 gives one ground rule for every guard-milestone pair of every stage in the model to
invalidate the milestone if a stage opens. We encode the prerequisite asPri = m and the
consequent as Cri = ¬m′′. The antecedent has the same encoding as the antecedent of the
corresponding PAC-1 rule that opens the stage.
PAC-5 gives one ground rule for every milestone in the model to close the stage when the
milestone is fulfilled. We encode the prerequisite as Pri = s, the antecedent as Ari =
¬m ∧m′, and the consequent as Cri = ¬s′′.
PAC-6 gives one ground rule for every stage that is not a top-level stage in the model to close
it when its parent Sp is closed. prerequisite as Pri = s, the antecedent as Ari = sp ∧ ¬s′p ,
and the consequent as Cri = ¬s′′.
Since the semantics of the PAC rules depends on the previous snapshot as well as the current
pre-snapshot, the transition relation for each PAC rule needs to consider three different states.
The transitions generated by PAC rule i with the unprimed variables for Σ, primed for Σi and
double primed for Σi+1 are given as:
δri = {((e p x t , e′p′ x′ t′ ,e′′p′′ x′′ t′′) | ((Pri(x) = true ∧ Ari(x e x′) ∧ x′′ = Cri(x′))
∨ (Pri(x) = false ∧ x′′ = x′)) ∧ e′′ = e′ ∧ p′′ = p′ ∧ t′′ = t′}
The transition relation gives a new pre-snapshot Σi+1 for a given snapshot Σ and pre-snapshot
Σi. If we build the conjunction of δr1 with δ 1 , we get a formula that describes the first and
second pre-snapshots following any snapshot Σ. Because we are only interested in the latest
pre-snapshot, we remove the middle state as follows:
δ 1 ◦ δr1 = ∃x′δ 1 ∧ δr1 [x′′/x′]
The result is again a formula in e p x t and e′ p′ x′ t′ and gives us the pre-snapshots that can be
generated by Σ in two steps. To complete δ 1 ◦ δ 2 we repeat this step for all PAC rules in the
pre-computed order.
Note that, while P only accesses a single variable, expressions for A are more complex and
may contain specialised operators. For example, StageActive(y) is true if a status variable
corresponding to the stage y is true, independently of whether it was activated during the current
micro step computation, or during some previous B-step. The truth value of this operator can
be determined by accessing a status variable in x′. By contrast, StageActivatedOnEvent(y)
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is only true if the stage just has been activated. Such an expression requires access to the
previous snapshot Σ. If the corresponding flag was false there, and is true in x′, then the stage
was activated in the current B-step computation and the StageActivatedOnEvent(y) is true.
Similarly, there is an expression that is true if and only if the current B-step computation was
set off by event ei, which requires access to e
′. Access to e allows us to reason about pending
events.
3.3.3 Creating a New B-Step
The final phase 3 computes the resulting new snapshot Σ′ from Σ and the last pre-snapshot Σn
by computing a new set of pending tasks and holding the data from Σn−1 constant. An event is
pending if it either was pending before the last B-step but was not executed, or it was created
in the last B-step. Computing the remaining events is simply done by selecting all events from
Σ that are not in Σn:
δrem = {(x e , x′e′, x′′e′′) | x′′ = x′ ∧
∧
0≤i<m
e′′i = ei ∧ ¬e′i}
A task is created when an atomic stage is activated during a B-step execution, i.e., the
respective state attribute is set in Σn−1 but not in Σ. A pending task is disabled if its atomic
stage is inactivated during the B-step, the respective state attribute is set in Σ but not in Σn−1
For simplicity we denote the set of tasks that are issued by newly activated atomic stages as T+
and the set of disabled task as T−. The final transition to update pending tasks is now given as:





i ∈ T+∨(t′′i /∈ T−∧ti))}
The final transition relation is now given as δ = δ 1 ◦ δ 2 ◦ δ 3 where the concatenations are
done analogously to δri .
3.3.4 Temporal and Epistemic Relations of Agents
The agent uses the protocol to decide on events to send depending on its local state. The
protocol makes sure that no events are sent to instances outside its window. However, if there
is uncertainty of the exact global state the agent is in because of ν, an event is selected if the
agent thinks corresponding state to be possible. To extract only the event and the restriction
on the data, all other variables are removed by existential quantification, where e denotes the




(∃x 6∈(νi∪e) : ℘i(ι, v) ∧ Σ|i ∧ v ∧ ωi(ι))
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Having defined the Boolean representation of the protocol, we compute the transition
functions for AutoAgent and external agent as follows:
δ0(∅,Σ, t, V ) = {(e,Σ, t′, V ) | e ∈ t ∧ t′ = t \ e}
δ1≤i≤n(∅,Σ, t, V ) = {(e,Σ, t, V ′) | ∃ι∈li(Σ) : e ∈ ℘i(ι, v) ∧ v′ = µi(e, v)}
where ∅ denotes that no event is selected for execution.
The full transition relation τ in AC-MAS is computed in two steps, where first an event is
selected among the the agents, and then the state change in Γ, as described in the previous
section, is performed. To sketch the correspondence with τ , we investigate the results of a
transition of the agent 0 followed by a step of the environment
(∅,Σ, t, V ) 0→ (e,Σ, t′, V ) E→ (∅,Σ′, t′′, V )
using the definitions of the δE and δ0, we get (Σ
′, gen) = δ(Σ, e), e ∈ t and t′′ = (t ∪ gen) \ e. It
is easy to see that, by identifying e with the actions of the environment agent aE and the agent
a0, this result corresponds to the definition of τ in Section 3.1.2. We get a similar result for
a transition with an external agent, in which case e is not removed from t. Note that this is
correct as external events cannot be in t and therefore also do not need to be removed. Note
furthermore, that by definition of δE and δi only events that adhere to the protocol are selected.
To evaluate epistemic properties, we need the set of states an agent cannot distinguish.
The standard approach for computing indistinguishable states, e.g., in MCMAS [LQR09], is
existential quantification of the variables that are not observable. While this works in our setting
to compute ∼i for a view that is limited to variables by νi, we additionally have to consider ω,
which hides all information about instances outside the window. To consider ω, we compute the




((∃x6∈νi(ι) : Σ ∧ ωi(ι)) ∨ ¬ωi(ι))
Note that ι ranges over all possible instances of the model νi(ι), and ωi(ι) is the Boolean
function ωi that is instantiated with the variables from artifact instance ι. Intuitively, we
construct the local state of an agent in a given snapshot by removing variables not in the view
for instances inside the window and all variables for instances outside of the window.
3.4 Specifications
In this section we define the temporal-epistemic logic IQ-CTLK, which supports quantification
over artifact instances and has a limited support for data. We also show how to verify an
AC-MAS model against IQ-CTLK specifications.
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3.4.1 The Logic IQ-CTLK
We are interested in specifying temporal-epistemic properties of agents interacting with the
artifact system, as well as the system itself. Since GSM supports the dynamic creation of
unnamed artifacts, the properties need to be independent of the actual number or possible IDs of
artifact instances in the system. To specify such properties we here define a temporal-epistemic
logic that supports quantification over the artifact instances. We call the logic IQ-CTLK, for
Instance Quantified CTLK, where CTLK is the usual epistemic logic on branching time [PL03].
It is a subset of FO-CTLK where quantification can only be over artifact instances but not data.
The syntax is defined in BNF notation as follows:
ϕ ::= > | p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | EXϕ | EGϕ | E(ϕUϕ) | Kiϕ | ∀x : R ϕ | ∃x : R ϕ
where R is the name of an artifact type and p is an atomic proposition over the private data of
agents and the attributes of active instances that are specified in terms of instance variables
bound by the quantification operators. The quantified instance variables range over the active
instances of a given artifact type R in the state where the quantification is evaluated and must
be bound. We write R(s) for the set of instances of type R in s. The remaining CTL operators
can be constructed by combination of the ones given above, the same way as in Section 2.2.2.
The defined operators are read as follows: EXϕ means there is a next state in which ϕ
holds; EGϕ conveys there is a run where ϕ holds in every state; E(ϕUψ) denotes there is a
run in which ϕ holds until ψ holds; Kiϕ: expresses agent i knows ϕ; ∀x : R represents for all
instances of type R; and ∃x : R says there is an instance of type R. For example, the formula
AG ∀x : OrderAF Kix.sent states that at any reachable state, the agent i will eventually know
that the attribute sent will be set to true for every active instance of type Order.
We inductively define the semantics of IQ-CTLK over an AC-MAS P as follows. A formula
ϕ is true in a state s of P , written (P , s) |= ϕ, iff:
(P , s) |= >
(P , s) |= p iff p ∈ Λ(s)
(P , s) |= ¬ϕ iff it is not the case that (P , s) |= ϕ
(P , s) |= ϕ ∨ ψ iff (P , s) |= ϕ or (P , s) |= ψ
(P , s) |= EXϕ iff exists s′ : s→ s′ and (P , s′) |= ϕ
(P , s) |= EGϕ iff exists r ∈ rs : for all i ≥ 0 : (P , r[i]) |= ϕ
(P , s) |= E(ϕUψ) iff exists r ∈ rs : exists k ≥ 0 : (P , r[k]) |= ψ and
for all j < k(P , r[j]) |= ϕ
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(P , s) |= Kiϕ iff for all s′ ∈ S : s ∼i s′ implies (P , s′) |= ϕ
(P , s) |= ∀x : R ϕ iff for all u ∈ R(s) : (P , s) |= ϕ[u/x]
(P , s) |= ∃x : R ϕ iff exists u ∈ R(s) : (P , s) |= ϕ[u/x]
Note that the above semantics provides an information-theoretic definition of knowledge,
i.e., Ki expresses what agent i can infer from the information available to him. An agent knows
that ϕ is true in state s if ϕ is true in all states s′, which the agent cannot distinguish from s.
This means the agent does not need to build a knowledge base, from which he can deduce new
information, since he already knows everything he could possibly deduce in a certain situation.
This definition can lead to counterintuitive conclusions. Consider, for instance, an agent who
cannot observe a milestone m1 because it is outside of his view. This milestone can only be
achieved if another milestone, m2, has been achieved first and the agent can observe it. Then
the agent will know whether milestone m1 has been achieved or not, even though he cannot see
the milestone.
Given an AC-MAS model P and an IQ-CTLK specification ϕ, the model checking problem
concerns establishing whether the formula ϕ holds at the initial state of P , written P |= ϕ. In
the context of our formal model, an AC-MAS P satisfies ϕ if (P , I) |= ϕ. Intuitively this means
that the model P satisfies ϕ if ϕ is true in the initial state of P .
3.4.2 Verification
To verify systems against specifications in IQ-CTLK, the specifications are rewritten by replacing
the quantification operators with formulas that range over the actual instances. This is possible
because the maximum number of instances is known at the start of the verification. Quantification
over IQ-CTLK ranges over all active instances. Because artifact instances are created dynamically
at run-time, the number of active instances is not known a priori and needs to be considered
in the formula. We use the expression created(ι) to check if an instance was created, i.e., the








: created(ι) ∧ ϕ
Note that for any existential formula to be valid, at least one of the instances needs to be
active, which is not the case in the initial state. Quantifiers can be nested and are resolved
recursively. By rewriting for the formulas into CTLK and using the computed transition relation
and epistemic relation, the model checking of AC-MAS can be done by employing the labelling
algorithm described in Section 2.2.3.
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3.5 Summary
In this chapter we put forward a methodology for the practical verification of GSM-MAS. The
approach consists of defining a formal map from the declarative language GSM to an extension
of previously studied AC-MAS, a semantics for reasoning about MAS in a quantified setting of
the artifact system environment. We reported on a technique that uses this map and supports
temporal-epistemic specifications in which quantification is allowed over artifact instances.
Note that, while GSM is declarative, and the semantics can be characterised in terms of a
fixed point, the equivalence theorem allows for procedural definition of the operational semantics.
Should we support a solely declarative language for service flows, such as DecSerFlow [vdAP06],
we would need to define a mapping to a transition system, otherwise the approach described
here could not be applied.
The restrictions placed on the AC-MAS have an impact on the soundness and completeness
of the approach. The bound in the number of instances restricts the possible behaviour of
the system, while data abstraction leads to an over approximation. This may lead to loss of
soundness or completeness when the limits of the artifact instances are reached. The exact
outcome depends on the type of the property considered. A violation of a universal property,
for instance, denotes a violation on the full unbounded model even if the bound was exceeded
during the computation. In contrast, if an existential property is not satisfied, no conclusion
can be drawn regarding the full model in general.
These are limitations of the technique but, as we show in Chapter 6, interesting scenarios
can still be analysed. We obtain experimental results for the Order-to-Cash application that
suggest the practical verification of reasonably sophisticated GSM-MAS is feasible for valuable
scenarios in business processes and services.
In the next chapter we extend the work reported here with the support of limited quan-
tification over data and target problems with scalability by introducing an abstraction step.
Theoretical studies [BHCDG+13, BLP12a] point to undecidability in settings where unbounded
data is present. We use predicate abstraction to achieve a transfer of the verification out-
come from finite abstract to unbounded concrete models. In particular, we employ 3-valued
abstraction [SG08], a technique that detects insufficient information in the abstract model.
4 3-Valued Predicate
Abstraction via SMT
The verification approach proposed in the previous chapter is hindered by the large state space
that stems from GSM detailed information models and potentially unbound data types like
integers. While these data types are required to store the information in the artifact system,
the dynamic behaviour only depends on a finite number of conditions that are tested in the
sentries and the formulas for agent definitions and verification.
To make a GSM program more amenable for verification, we use 3-valued abstraction [SG08,
CDEG03] to replace the concrete data by predicates that only capture the key information
required for the behavioural analysis. These predicates contain not only propositional atoms,
but also atoms over theories, such as integers, real numbers or sets. Deciding the satisfiability
of such predicates sets modulo the background theories is known as the Satisfiability Modulo
Theories (SMT) problem, and the theorem provers for solving the problem are called SMT
solvers [LNO06]. In this chapter we extend 3-valued abstraction to the epistemic setting, adapt
an SMT solver to evaluate the predicates, and apply the technique to GSM-MAS.
4.1 3-Valued Abstraction for AC-MAS
Predicate abstraction [GS97, Sa¨ı00], briefly introduced in Section 2.2.7, is a technique that
generates a sound approximation to verify properties of infinite state systems. It traditionally
leads to an over-approximation of the possible behaviour that is conservative for safety properties
but may lead to false counterexamples or, for other properties, even to unsound results. 3-valued
abstraction has been employed [CDEG03, SG08] to overcome these limitations by interpreting
both over- and under-approximations. This enables abstract models to be conservative for both
positive and negative results and permits to identify cases where the abstraction is not detailed
enough and requires refinement
We extend this technique to the epistemic setting and introduce the 3-valued semantics for
the epistemic µ-calculus on extended artifact-centric multi-agent systems, variant of AC-MAS
with two transition functions. We define a simulation relation between two systems that preserves
both satisfaction and refutation of a property and give sufficient conditions for an abstraction
to ensure the simulation relation.
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4.1.1 AC-MAS with Over-/Under-Approximations
In what follows we define an extension of AC-MAS, a semantics previously used to reason about
artifact-centric multi-agent systems [BLP12a] introduced in Section 2.2.1. The structures here
defined differ from plain AC-MAS by replacing the transition function τ with a may transition
function τm and a must transition function τM .
Definition 12 (Extended AC-MAS). Given an environment E, a set A of agents, and a
set AP of atomic propositions, an extended artifact-centric multi-agent system is a tuple
P = 〈S, I, Act, τm, τM ,Λ〉, where
• S ⊆ LE × L1 × · · · × Ln is the set of reachable global states,
• I is the initial state,
• Act = ActE × Act1 × · · · × Actn is the set of actions,
• τm : S × Act→ 2S is the global may transition function, and
• τM : S × Act→ 2S is the global must transition function.
• Λ : S → 2AP is the evaluation function for propositions.
Note that AC-MAS can be thought of as a concrete system that directly corresponds to
Extended AC-MAS where τ , τm, and τM coincide.
4.1.2 Abstraction
The following definition formalises the relation between two Extended AC-MAS models and
enables us to reason about preservation of epistemic µ-calculus formulas [GJ02].
Definition 13 (Simulation). Let P = 〈S, I, Act, τmτM ,Λ〉 and P ′ = 〈S ′, I ′, Act′τ ′mτ ′M ,Λ′〉 be
Extended AC-MAS over the same set A of agents and sets AP ′ ⊆ AP of propositions. A
simulation relation between P and P ′ is a relation '⊆ S × S ′ such that:
1. s′ ∈ I ′ iff there exists s ∈ I, such that s ' s′;
and whenever s ' s′ then:
2. if s
may−→ t then there exists s′ ∈ S ′, such that s′ may−→′ t′ and t ' t′;
3. if s′ must−→′ t′ then there exists t ∈ S, such that s must−→ t and t ' t′;
4. if s
may∼i t then there exists s′ ∈ S ′, such that s′ may∼i ′ t′ and t ' t′;
5. if s′ must∼i ′ t′ then there exists t ∈ S, such that s must∼i t and t ' t′;
6. Λ′(s′) ⊆ Λ(s);
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If there is a simulation relation between P and P ′, we say that P ′ simulates P, or P  P ′.
The logic we consider here is the epistemic µ-calculus [BDE13]. Recall from Section 2.2.4 that
the modal µ-calculus is a powerful formalism for expressing properties of transition systems using
fix-point operators. Let AP be a finite set of atomic propositions and V a set of propositional
variables. We define the syntax of epistemic µ-calculus language L in BNF notation as follows:
ϕ ::= > | p | Z | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 2ϕ | Kiϕ | µZ.ϕ | νZ.ϕ
where p ∈ AP and Z ∈ V. The syntactic combinations µZ and νZ are called the least
and greatest fix-point operators respectively. An environment ρ : V → 2S interprets the free
propositional variable Z as a set of states. Any occurrence of Z in ϕ falls within an even number
of negations in order for the formulas µZ.ϕ and νZ.ϕ to be monotonic in Z. Furthermore, we
assume that formulas are closed and well-named, i.e., all propositional variables are bound
exactly once in any formula. In addition to satisfaction (tt) and refutation (ff), we write ⊥
to express that the truth value is unknown. We define the 3-valued semantics for L in line
with [SG08] and extend it by the epistemic operator Ki as follows:
Definition 14 (3-Valued Semantics). Let P be Extended AC-MAS. The 3-valued semantics of




tt, if s ∈ JϕKP,ρtt
ff, if s ∈ JϕKP,ρff
⊥, otherwise
The tt-set JϕKP,ρtt ⊆ S for ϕ ∈ L over Extended AC-MAS P = 〈S, I, Act, τmτM ,Λ〉 is defined
as follows (the ff-set JϕKP,ρff is defined dually):
J>KP,ρtt = S J>KP,ρff = ∅JpKP,ρtt = {s ∈ S : p ∈ Λ(s)} JpKP,ρff = {s ∈ S : ¬p ∈ Λ(s)}JZKP,ρtt = ρ(Z) JZKP,ρff = ρ(Z)J¬ϕKP,ρtt = JϕKP,ρff J¬ϕKP,ρff = JϕKP,ρttJϕ1 ∧ ϕ2KP,ρtt = Jϕ1KP,ρtt ∩ Jϕ2KP,ρtt Jϕ1 ∧ ϕ2KP,ρff = Jϕ1KP,ρff ∪ Jϕ2KP,ρffJ2ϕKP,ρtt = ax(JϕKP,ρtt ) J2ϕKP,ρff = ex(JϕKP,ρff )JµZ.ϕKP,ρtt = lfp(λg.JϕKP,ρ[Z 7→g]tt ) JµZ.ϕKP,ρff = gfp(λg.JϕKP,ρ[Z 7→g]ff )JνZ.ϕKP,ρtt = gfp(λg.JϕKP,ρ[Z 7→g]tt ) JνZ.ϕKP,ρff = lfp(λg.JϕKP,ρ[Z 7→g]ff )JKiϕKP,ρtt = axi(JϕKP,ρtt ) JKiϕKP,ρff = exi(JϕKP,ρff ) ∪ JϕKP,ρff
where for X ⊆ S: ax(X) = {s | ∀s′ : s may−→ s′ ⇒ X(s′)}, ex(X) = {s | ∃s′ : s must−→ s′ ∧X(s′)},
axi(X) = {s | ∀s′ : s may∼i s′ ⇒ X(s′)}, and exi(X) = {s | ∃s′ : s must∼i s′ ∧ X(s′)}. Intuitively,
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ax returns states whose may successors are all in X, which means that more may successors
(over-approximation) lead to a smaller tt set. In contrast, ex computes all states for which at
least one must transition exists, which means that less must successors (under-approximation)
lead to a smaller ff set. axi and exi are the corresponding operators for the epistemic relations.
Note that we can add states JϕKP,ρff without the loss of soundness since agent i does definitely
not know ϕ in states where ϕ is false.
The model P satisfies formula ϕ, or [P |3= ϕ] = tt, if all its initial states are in JϕKP,ρtt . The
model P refutes ϕ, or [P |3= ϕ] = ff, if at least one initial state is in JϕKP,ρff . Otherwise we say
[P |3= ϕ] = ⊥.
The following lemma guarantees the preservation of truth and falsity of L formulas from the
simulating system P ′ to the system P being simulated:
Lemma 1. Assume P  P ′. Then for every ϕ ∈ L if [P ′ |3= ϕ] = tt then [P |3= ϕ] = tt and if
[P ′ |3= ϕ] = ff then [P |3= ϕ] = ff.
Proof. Assume P  P ′. We show that
if s ' s′, s′ ∈ JϕKP ′,ρtt then s ∈ JϕKP,ρtt ; (4.1)
if s ' s′, s′ ∈ JϕKP ′,ρff then s ∈ JϕKP,ρff (4.2)
by induction over ϕ. The base step, ϕ is p ∈ AP ′, follows from the simulation requirement 6.
The induction step for the µ-calculus operators follows from the simulation requirement 2. for
tt and 3. for ff. The induction step for the epistemic modality follows from the simulation
requirement 4. for tt and 5. for ff. The Lemma follows from (4.1), (4.2), and the simulation
requirement 1., where the biconditional guarantees to preserve both tt and ff.
Definition 15 (Abstraction). Let P = 〈S, I, Act, τmτM ,Λ〉 and P ′ = 〈S ′, I ′, Act′τ ′mτ ′M ,Λ′〉 be
Extended AC-MAS over the same set A of agents and sets AP ′ ⊆ AP of propositions. We say
that P ′ is an abstraction of P if:
1. s′ ∈ I ′ iff there exists s ∈ I, such that s ∈ γ(s′);
2. s′ may−→′ t′ iff there exist s ∈ γ(s′) and t ∈ γ(t′), such that s may−→ t;
3. s′ must−→′ t′ iff for each s ∈ γ(s′) there exists t ∈ γ(t′), such that s must−→ t;
4. s′ may∼i ′ t′ iff there exist s ∈ γ(s′), t ∈ γ(t′) such that s may∼i t or there exists u′ such that
s′ may∼i u′ and u′ may∼i t′ (this recursively defines a chain of any length);
5. s′ must∼i ′ t′ iff for each s ∈ γ(s′) there exists t ∈ γ(t′), such that s must∼i t, and for each t ∈ γ(t′)
there exists s ∈ γ(s′), such that t must∼i s;
6. p ∈ Λ′(s′) iff p ∈ Λ(s) for each s ∈ γ(s′);
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where γ : S ′ 7→ 2S is the concretisation function that maps each abstract state s′ ∈ S ′ to the
non-empty set of concrete states Ss′ ⊆ S it represents; may−→′ and may−→ are the may transition
relations in P ′ and P respectively; must−→′ and must−→ are the must transition relations; may∼i ′ and may∼i
are the may epistemic possibility relations; and must∼i ′ and must∼i are the must epistemic possibility
relations.
May transition relations in the abstract model P ′ over-approximate may transition relations
in the concrete model P; they represent every concrete may transition relation between two
states in P . Conversely, must transition relations in the abstract model P ′ under-approximate
must transition relations in the concrete model P; they correspond to concrete transition
relations that are common to all of the states of P represented by the source abstract state.
We define may and must epistemic possibility relations in the abstract system similarly to
the temporal case; however, there are additional constraints due to the nature of the relations.
Specifically, we require both to be equivalence relations. This is achieved by building the
transitive closure for
may∼i , while relations in must∼i that are not symmetric are removed. By insisting
on equivalence relations, we ensure that the usual KT45 axioms for knowledge are satisfied in
the abstract model.
Note that if the abstract may epistemic possibility relation were defined analogously to
abstract may transition relations, it would not necessarily be transitive. Therefore, we define the
abstract may epistemic possibility relation as the transitive closure of this relation. Similarly,
if the abstract must epistemic possibility relation were defined analogously to abstract must
transition relations, it would not be necessarily symmetric. Therefore, we remove the abstract
must epistemic possibility relations that are not symmetric.
The labelling of an abstract state is defined so that it is consistent with the labelling of all
the concrete states it represents. The biconditional ensures that the abstract labelling function
is exact. Note that all Extended AC-MAS models P abstracted in such a way are consistent,
i.e., JϕKtt ∩ JϕKff = ∅ for any ϕ ∈ L, since must−→⊆ may−→ and must∼i⊆may∼i . Therefore the set JϕKP,ρ⊥ can
be computed as S\(JϕKP,ρtt ∪ JϕKP,ρff ).
Lemma 2. If P ′ is an abstraction of Extended AC-MAS P then P  P ′.
Proof. We show that if P ′ is abstraction of P then {(s, s′) | s ∈ γ(s′)} is the simulation relation
'. The simulation requirement 1. follows from the requirement 1. in Definition 15. The
simulation requirement 2. follows from the if direction of the requirement 2. in Definition 15.
The simulation requirement 3. follows from the only if direction of the requirement 3. in
Definition 15. The simulation requirement 4. follows from the if direction of the requirement
4. in Definition 15 for n = 1. The simulation requirement 5. follows from the only if direction
of the requirement 5. in Definition 15. The simulation requirement 6. follows from the only if
direction of the requirement 6. in Definition 15 for all p ∈ AP ′.
Theorem 2 (Preservation). Let P ′ be an abstraction of Extended AC-MAS P. Then for every
ϕ ∈ L, if [P ′ |3= ϕ] 6= ⊥ then [P |3= ϕ] = [P ′ |3= ϕ].
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Proof. Theorem follows from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, where for P we have τM = τm = τ and
may∼i=must∼i =∼i
4.2 Predicate Abstraction for Extended AC-MAS
We now instantiate the theory by presenting a methodology for constructing abstract Extended
AC-MAS from concrete GSM programs. We show that these abstractions preserve both the
satisfaction and the refutation of epistemic µ-calculus specifications. This process includes the
abstraction of the data to build a finite model, as well as the computation of temporal and
epistemic may and must relations.
More specifically, we define a procedure that takes as input a GSM program P and a
specification ϕ in the epistemic µ-calculus and returns as output an abstract Extended AC-MAS
P ′. If checking P ′ |= ϕ returns either true or false, we can deduce that this is also the result on
P , the concrete model for the GSM program in question. In other words, in these circumstances
we can deduce whether the program satisfies φ. If the result of the check on the abstract
model is undefined, no conclusion can be drawn on whether the GSM program satisfies the
specification. We define the components of P ′ and then show that the abstract model so defined
is an appropriate abstraction.
4.2.1 Predicates
We first discuss how we define the global states of P ′ using predicates and how we compute them
by calling an SMT solver. In line with other predicate abstraction procedures, we represent
states in the abstract system by defining predicates on Boolean variables that represent the
validity of expressions in the concrete system. The predicates are selected by analysing the GSM
program and the specification to be verified. We retain the status attributes of the lifecycle, as
these are already Boolean, but replace the potentially unbound data attributes from the concrete
system by predicates that capture the key conditions in the system. A predicate represents
a Boolean condition that is either true or false in the corresponding states of the concrete
system and correspond to a binary relation (=, 6=, <,≤, >,≥) or quantification over sets of data
(∃, ∀). The initial selection of predicates is performed purely syntactically by analysing the GSM
program and substituting all the relevant expressions εi by the corresponding predicates pi.
In contrast to classical predicate abstraction methodologies that build abstractions locally
to single execution blocks (programs or routines), the declarative nature of GSM programs and
the quantification over artifact instances results in predicates that are not clearly associated
with single instances or agents, but shared between those components. To account for this,
we distinguish between predicates that are local to an artifact instance or agent, and mixed
predicates that are shared. As an example, consider k instances of an artifact type A and
formula ∀a : A ∃b : A a.x > b.y. We generate k2 predicates of the form Ai.x > Aj.y where
















































































Figure 4.1: BDD layout of the abstracted GSM-MAS.
0 ≤ i, j < k. For k = 2, this gives the following predicates:
p0 = A0.x > A0.y; p2 = A1.x > A0.y;
p1 = A0.x > A1.y; p3 = A1.x > A1.y.
The predicates p0 and p3 only refer to attributes that are local to an instance and are therefore
converted to p0 = p3 = x > y and treated as instance variables. For p1 and p2, however, the
instance information is essential and needs to be preserved in the further analysis. Such mixed
variables are shared among the corresponding instances and conceptually part of either state
space. They do, however, share the same representation in the BDD as shown in Figure 4.1.
We use an SMT solver to filter out predicates with equivalent expressions εi ≡ εj. This is
done by issuing pairwise calls in the form pi = εi ∧ pj = εj ∧ pi 6= pj to the solver. If there is no
assignment to the concrete attributes to fulfil such a query, the predicates are equivalent for all
concrete values and only one of them needs to be considered. In the example above, one of p0
or p3 will be removed from the set of predicates.
The generation of the predicates as above also indirectly defines the evaluation function
for them to be used in the abstract model. To compute the initial state, the initial value for
the predicates is assigned by evaluating their definitions for the initial values of the concrete
variables. This is again done by using queries to the SMT solver, which computes all evaluations
for predicates that fulfil the formula
∧
pi∈predicates(pi = εi) ∧
∧
vj
(vj = initj), where εi is the
concrete expression the predicate pi represents, vj are concrete variables used in εi, and initj is
the corresponding initial value. This ensures that the set of states represented by the initial
state of the abstract system includes the initial state of the concrete system.
Defining the abstract state using status and data predicates as defined above guarantees that
the abstract system retains the same BDD layout, while maintaining an over-approximation
of the data space of the concrete system. These properties of the data predicates also serve
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as a basis for the abstraction of the transition and epistemic relations that are given in the
remainder of this section.
4.2.2 Transition Relations
While several concrete states correspond to an abstract state, the abstract model is defined
on the same actions of the concrete model. However, since the predicates do not capture the
full information that is available in the concrete system, temporal changes to predicates in the
abstract system may only approximate the corresponding changes in the concrete data. In the
following we describe how the temporal relations for the abstract model are generated.
To generate the may and must transition relations for P ′, we use SMT calls on the states
built above. We need the SMT calls only for the evaluation of assignments during the execution
of an event δ 1 presented in Section 3.3.1 and for updates to private variables of agents. Note
that we assume that the SMT solver always returns a concrete answer. This is a reasonable
assumption since the assignments are fully deterministic.
We describe this procedure by means of a simple example. Consider the abstraction of a
simple non-negative integer counter in Figure 2.6 from Section 2.2.7. We omit may transitions
that coincide with a must transition. The system consists of a single integer variable x that is
initialised to 0 and gets incremented by 1 at each step using the assignment x := x+ 1. The
abstract states are based on the predicates p : x < 3 and q : x = 3. Using an SMT solver,
we initialise the abstract counter to the abstract state pq. The may transitions are computed
by queries to the SMT solver using next state variables to represent the effect of a concrete
transition on the abstract state. The query for the example has the form:
p = (x < 3) ∧ q = (x = 3) ∧ p′ = (x′ < 3) ∧ q′ = (x′ = 3) ∧ x′ = x+ 1
The SMT solver checks if the query is satisfiable and, if it is, returns a satisfying assignment
to the variables. The query above is satisfiable for p, p′, q, q′, x = 2, and x′ = 3, which
corresponds to the abstract transition pq
may−→ pq. To get further transitions, we add the
constraint ¬(p ∧ p′ ∧ q ∧ q′) to exclude the already known transition and continue incrementally
until no more transitions can be found, i.e., the query becomes unsatisfiable. In the example
above, the full set of may transitions is pq
may−→ pq, pq may−→ pq, pq may−→ pq, and pq may−→ pq.
The computation of a must transition can be expressed by a query to the SMT solver with
a universal quantification over all its corresponding concrete start states. However, SMT solvers
are optimised for existential quantification, i.e., detecting if an assignmentexists such that the
query is satisfied. To avoid the expensive computation of the universal quantification, we exploit
the fact that the statements in GSM are deterministic, i.e., that for any statement there is only
one transition in the concrete system. If all concrete states in an abstract state have the same
successor, the abstract state has only one successor for a given expression. A must transition
therefore corresponds to the case where there exists only one outgoing may transition from the
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Algorithm 6 computeAbstractTransitions(ϕ)
1: τm ← ∅, τM ← ∅, s← ∅, t← ∅
2: smt.assert(ϕ)
3: while smt.isSat() || s 6= ∅ do







11: if s = ∅ then . new src state





17: if not smt.isSat() then . unique transition




22: τm ← τm ∨ (s ∧ t)
23: smt.assert( ¬(s ∧ t) )
24: end while
abstract state for the given expression.
In our example we have only two must transition, pq must−→ pq and pq must−→ pq. Both may and
must can be computed effectively at the same time by guiding the SMT search and fixing the
start state in the queries until no more new destinations can be found.
Algorithm 6 takes the formula ϕ that describes how concrete and abstract states are related
via predicates and generates the abstract transition relations τm and τM by using the SMT solver
smt. The command isSat() evaluates the satisfiability of the current formula; the command
assert(ϕ) adds a new assertion ϕ; all assertions after an push() command are removed by a
following pop(); commands getSrc() and getDest() return the source and destination states
respectively.
The abstraction algorithm works as follows: In the first iteration we get a new abstract
transition s → t and fix the source s to compute all outgoing transitions from s. After that,
if the formula is not satisfiable, the current source state s is removed from it, otherwise a
destination state t is selected. If there is no source state s, a new source is selected and fixed and
the destination t is removed. If the formula with these new assertions is not satisfied, there are
no other destinations from s and the transition s→ t is a must transition. Then the transition
s→ t is added to the set of may transitions and removed from the formula. The procedure is
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repeated until either the formula is not satisfiable, or the source s is empty. This means that
there are no more abstract transitions.
4.2.3 Epistemic Relations
The next step in the definition of P ′ concerns the computation of the epistemic relations for the
agents in the system. This computation is done analogously to the concrete case by considering
the equality of the local components. As discussed earlier, agents can distinguish between global
states by considering their local states defined by their private variables, the view ν and the
window ω. Written as Boolean formula, the set of indistinguishable states for a set of statesX





((∃x 6∈νi(ι) : X ∧ ωiι(X)) ∨ ¬ωiι(X)) ∧R
where ωiι is true only for values satisfying the window and R is the set of reachable states.
To build the abstract epistemic relations, the set of indistinguishable states has to be
expressed in terms of the predicates defining the abstract states. Note that we select the set of
predicates such that each expression in ωiι corresponds to a local predicate. This means that
the abstract window ω′ is exact and we have for any abstract state x: ω(γ(x)) = ω′(x); the
abstract and concrete window functions represent the exact same states and can be used in
the same way for the computation of the epistemic relation. For the abstraction of the view ν,
however, we have to consider predicates with corresponding variables from inside and outside
of ν, and in case of mixed predicates even from different instances and agents. To compute
the correct abstraction, we therefore compute two setsνmay and νmust and employ heuristics to
ensure that we compute the correct over- and under-approximations.
For the over-approximation
may∼i , we select only local predicates for νmay that exclusively refer
to visible variables in ν. This ensures that an agent can distinguish two states in the abstract
system only if it has enough visibility in the concrete system to determine the value of the
predicates. We exclude mixed predicates since one or more of the referenced instances might be
outside the window ω and thus the predicate may be unknown. Note that fewer predicates in ν
result in more predicates being existentially quantified and thus a larger set ∼i (X), ensuring
over-approximation. The set is restricted by the set Rmay of reachable states computed with
may−→, which the abstract system considers possibly reachable.
For the must transitions must∼i , we need to ensure under-approximation; to this end for every s
and t we have s must∼i t iff for each of the concrete states in s there is a concrete state in t such that
there is an epistemic relation for agent i between them. Intuitively, this means that the we need
to consider every predicate for νmust that encodes at least one variable visible in the concrete
system. Note, however, that this is not sufficient. In some cases the predicates allow to infer








p : x = 1
q : x > y
(x, y) 2{0, 1}⇥ {0, 1}
Figure 4.2: Indistinguishable states of an agent given y ∈ ν.
information about a value even if it is not visible. This may be the case if predicates are not
independent from each other. Consider the example in Figure 4.2 with p : x = 1 and q : x > y
with visible variable y. In the concrete system, (x, y) = (1, 1) is distinguishable from (0, 0),
but not from (0, 1). To compute must∼i with visible predicate q and only quantify p would result
in a transition between pq and pq, which is not a proper under-approximation because of the
missing epistemic relation between (0, 0) and (1, 1) in the concrete system. To ensure a proper
under-approximation, we transitively select all predicates that share variables with predicates
already in νmust and also include mixed predicates. We restrict
must∼i by Rmust, computed by must−→,
which corresponds to the set of states that are known to be reachable in the concrete system.
4.2.4 Correctness
The methodology described above to build P ′ ensures that satisfaction and refutation of epistemic
µ-calculus properties is preserved.
Theorem 3. Let P ′ be constructed from Extended AC-MAS P using the methodology above.
Then for every ϕ ∈ L, if [P ′ |3= ϕ] 6= ⊥ then [P |3= ϕ] = [P ′ |3= ϕ].
Proof. We show that P ′ is an abstraction of P. The abstraction requirements 1 and 6 from
Definition 15 follow directly from the construction of I ′ and the selection of propositions as
predicates respectively. The abstraction requirement 2 follows from the existential quantification
in the computation of
may−→ using the SMT solver. The abstraction requirement 3 is ensured by
computing an under-approximation of the strongest possible must−→ transition. Note that even in
the presence of non-determinism, the requirement is still fulfilled, although the result could be less
exact. The abstraction requirement 4 is ensured by retaining only predicates the concrete system
has full information of and removing all predicates with no or incomplete information from
the abstract view, thus ensuring an over-approximation. Finally, the abstraction requirement








vars: int order = 10;
protocol:
CustomerOrder: {CustomerOrder./CustomerOrder/BuyerId} == "D2" and
{CustomerOrder./CustomerOrder/Price} < 10;
Create: {CustomerOrder./CustomerOrder/ProductQuantity == order;




Figure 4.3: Buyer with price limit.
5 is ensured by selecting all predicates that have some dependency to the visible concrete
variables even if they do not directly reason about visible variables. The remaining predicates
are unrelated; so no information can be inferred, thus retaining the under-approximation. The
result then follows from Theorem 2.
4.3 Example
To illustrate the abstraction technique, we slightly update the Order-to-Cash example from
Section 2.1.3. Consider the Seller runs a special sale in which all orders of less than 50
items are upgraded to 50 items, while all other sales are processed normally. This is imple-
mented by updated guards to the Initialization stage of the CustomerOrder (CO) artifact
type (see Figure 2.4): self.Create.onEvent(...) and self.ProductQuantity < 50; and
self.Create.onEvent(...) and self.ProductQuantity >= 50
In the first case, the CO executes the assignment self.ProductQuantity := 50 to update
the quantity of the order. For the second guard, the quantity is not changed. We furthermore
add a field Price for the selling price for an order, and Cost for the production cost. These
fields are also considered by agent D2, whose specification is summarised in Figure 4.3. Note
that the new agent definition also overloads the view to add Price, but that the Cost of the
full order is not visible to the Buyer. We are interested if in the new system with two buyers
there is a case in which the actual price attained for the order is less than the production costs:
EF exists(‘x’, ‘CO’)(x.Price < x.Costs).
Analysis of the guards and agent specification for D2 gives the following predicates (we
omit the scope of the variables and duplicate predicates): p0: ProductQuantity < 50; p1:
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Table 4.1: Solutions for the temporal transition query.








T F T 30 30 F T F 50 30
T F F 30 50 F T T 50 50
T F F 30 40 F T F 50 40
F T T 50 50 F T T 50 50
F T T 60 60 F T F 50 60
F T F 60 50 F T T 50 50
F T F 50 60 F T F 50 60
ProductQuantity >= 50; p2: BuyerId == "D2"; p3: ProductQuantity == order; p4: Price
< 10; p5: Price < Costs; p6: SellerId == "EDSAC". This set of predicates allows for direct,
syntactical abstraction of the agent’s window: p2; and protocol: CustomerOrder: p2 and p4;
Create: p3; Submit: p6; Receive: true; Cancel: true.
To compute the view, however, we have to analyse the constituting concrete variables of
each predicate. Agent D2 can see local variable order and the artifact fields ProductQuantity,
Price, BuyerId, and SellerId, but cannot see the actual Costs of the production. Recall
that the epistemic may abstraction over-approximates the epistemic relation, which corresponds
to less predicates in the view, while the epistemic must abstraction under-approximates, which
means it considers a smaller set of state possible and therefore is considered to see more details.
Applied to our set of predicates we have: viewmay = p0, p1, p2, p3, p4, p6; viewmust = p0, p1, p2,
p3, p4, p5, p6. Note that the view for must consists of the full set of predicates. We therefore
can be certain that no correction is required.
To compute the temporal changes caused by the expression ProductQuantity := 50, we
consider predicates that are related to the used variables in the expression: p0, p1 and p3. Other
predicates are kept constant. The temporal relation is computed using a query to the SMT
solver of the form:
p0 = (ProductQuantity < 50) ∧ p1 = (ProductQuantity >= 50)
∧ p3 = (ProductQuantity == order)
∧ p′0 = (ProductQuantity′ < 50) ∧ p′1 = (ProductQuantity′ >= 50)
∧ p′3 = (ProductQuantity′ == order′)
∧ ProductQuantity′ == 50 ∧ order′ == order
There are seven possible solutions for the query, shown in Table 4.1, even though there are
infinitely many possible combinations of values of ProductQuantitiy and order. We can obtain
such results using an SMT solver. Given the constraints on the predicates, p0 and p1 cannot
have the same value. We furthermore observe that order is not assigned to and therefore its
value remains constant. Otherwise, the value for the order is not constrained as the transition
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is computed in isolation.
Only the predicates are extracted from the results to give the may transitions: (T, F, T )
may−→
(F, T, F ), (T, F, F )
may−→ (F, T, T ), (T, F, F ) may−→ (F, T, F ), (F, T, T ) may−→ (F, T, T ), (F, T, T ) may−→
(F, T, F ), (F, T, F )
may−→ (F, T, T ), and (F, T, F ) may−→ (F, T, F ). There is only one abstract state,
(T, F, T ), with a single outgoing transition for the assignment. All other abstract states have
two successors because order may or may not be equal to 50. Both values for predicate p3
are therefore possible after execution of the statement. This leads to a single must transition
(T, F, T ) must−→ (F, T, F ).
4.4 Discussion
In this chapter we investigated predicate abstraction as a key technique to overcome the
difficulty of verifying infinite state spaces. We lifted 3-valued abstraction to epistemic µ-calculus,
which makes AC-MAS amenable to model checking against temporal-epistemic specifications.
Specifically, we have shown how epistemic models with under- and over-approximations can
be generated via SMT calls, how epistemic specification can be checked directly on these
abstractions and identified the conditions under which the checks on the abstract models can
ensure results on the concrete models of the program.
The potential benefits of 3-valued abstraction are huge as the verification of infinite-state
systems is, in general, undecidable. However, it does not come without a cost. Predicate
abstraction is best suited for control-flow oriented verification. Calling the SMT solver can
involve a substantial computational cost if we cannot generate reasonable predicates for the
data structures. The SMT solver also needs to support all required background theories. In case
of AC-MAS these theories are Arrays, Uninterpreted Functions and Linear Integer Arithmetic
Quantifiers (AUFLIA).
The major limitation of the abstraction technique is that at present we do not support
automatic refinement when the verification result is unknown. In this case the only option is to
add predicates manually. More over, the addition of predicates can split the abstract states
in such a way that the refined model becomes less precise, since a must transition can be lost
when a predicate is added. This makes automatic refinement even harder. Another limitation
is that we cannot generate predicates for all GSM expressions over data, which may lead to
unknown results. In particular, the approach does not support recursion in GSM programs.
Also, the optimisation for the computation of the must transition does not work for non-
deterministic systems, as we assume that there is a must transition iff there is only one may
transition from the source state. This holds only for deterministic systems such as GSM.
We based the technique on the work presented in [SG08], where the authors investigate
3-valued abstraction for µ-calculus. In comparison to this work, we have extended the idea to
the epistemic logic, developed a practical algorithm based on an SMT solver, and tailored the
technique to the case of GSM-based artifact systems. Note that the 3-valued abstraction can be
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separated from the GSM-based artifact systems and used in other contexts. Essentially, any
multi-agent system, which can be modelled using KMTS and encoded into BDDs and whose
predicates are solvable by an SMT solver, is easily amenable to the technique presented here.
We chose AC-MAS since we were investigating these systems before but the method is much
more general than that.
A possible alternative approach would be existential abstraction. The advantage of 3-valued
abstraction over this method is that it is more general and produces sound results for both
true and false formulas. Existential abstraction is, however, better suited for the abstraction
refinement. For instance, CEGAR [CGJ+03], which iteratively refines the abstract model by
removing spurious transition found in the model, cannot be directly applied when a formula
is unknown, as there are no counter-examples. Existential abstraction has been studied for
AC-MAS from a theoretical perspective in [BLP11, BLP12a, BLP12b, BL13]. The obtained
results identify decidable fragments through restrictions on the specification language and the
semantics. While these results are certainly valuable, they provide no constructive methodology
for the practical verification.
The discussion concludes the theoretical contributions of the research presented in this thesis.
We now provide the actual implementation of the techniques developed here.
5 Implementation: GSMC
In this chapter we introduce gsmc, a prototype model checker that implements the techniques
presented in Chapters 3 and 4. The tool is a command line application developed for Linux in
C/C++ using state-of-the-art libraries. gsmc is released under the terms of the GNU General
Public License (GPL) and the source code is available form [GGL+13]. The following sections
focus on the description of input languages and the implementation details of the model checker.
We also provide usage instructions and compare the tool to existing model checkers.
5.1 Inputs
Here we discuss the supported data types and define the syntax of the input files. gsmc operates
directly on artifact systems designed in the i-Hub editor, as described in section 2.1.4. Such
GSM programs are stored in an XML/XSD based format and can be deployed on the i-Hub
engine after verification. The description of roles and agents is supplied in a plain text file. The
properties are also given in a plain text file containing formulas in machine-readable IQ-CTLK.
The parsed inputs are cross-referenced and checked for semantic errors and inconsistency.
5.1.1 Supported Data Types
Data types in GSM are only declared and used without a formal definition or implementation
of the corresponding operations on them. This has the advantage that they can include data
attributes of arbitrary type and leave the actual implementation to a simulation engine like i-Hub.
To perform a correct analysis the data types need to be mapped to these actual implementations.
For the verification of concrete artifact systems, we support three data types to represent i-Hub
information models: Boolean, enumeration, and bounded integer. This allows for analysis of the
basic control structures, but is a rather limited set for potentially unbound data. However, for
the verification of abstract systems, we replace all data attributes from the concrete system with
Boolean predicates that capture the key conditions in the system, as we describe in Section 4.2.1.
In the following we give details on the mapping between data attributes in i-Hub GSM program
and the concrete implementation of gsmc.
A number of i-Hub data types have a direct correspondence. The i-Hub xs:boolean data
attribute with possible values true or false, for example, is directly mapped into a Boolean
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variable. The integer types xs:int and xs:long are mapped into bounded integer variables
where the user can define the lower and the upper bounds for each variable. We automatically
add an offset to the variables to optimise the BDD internal representation and correct different
offsets in the computations. We assume that any integer or long constants that appear in
assignments to variables are in the specified range. The user can also define data attributes with
predetermined lists of values. Such attributes are directly mapped into enumeration variables.
For data types without direct correspondence, some level of abstraction is required. We
use C++ style type-casting to convert the xs:double data type to a bounded integer. This
conversion between the two numerical types implies a loss of precision. For the xs:string data
type, we enumerate all the string constants in the model and convert string data attributes to
enumeration variables. Such variables can be assigned to any value that explicitly appears in
the model. In addition, we define a special value ⊥ that represents other possible unknown
string constants from the environment. This basic abstraction allows us to assign values and
compare strings for equality. More sophisticated string operations like concatenation are not
supported at present. We now describe the three input files of gsmc.
5.1.2 i-Hub File
The syntax of an i-Hub GSM program is reported in Section 2.1.4. We place some restrictions
on operators and expressions that can be used. In the following we give the grammar of the
permitted expressions over data and events. Formally, an expression is defined in BNF as:
expression ::= expression aop expression | expression lop expression
| not expression | GSM | constant | attributeID
where aop is an arithmetic operator; lop is a logic comparison operator; not is the negation;
GSM is a Boolean GSM operator from Table 5.1; constant is a Boolean, integer, double or string
constant; and attributeID is the identifier of a data attribute.
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Listing 5.1: Role definition from Order-to-Cash agent file.







8 window: {CustomerOrder./CustomerOrder/BuyerId} == $$;
9 instantiation: CustomerOrder;
10 transformation:
11 condense stage(CustomerOrder, Preparing),
12 delegate sentry(CustomerOrder, Prepare),
13 delegate sentry(CustomerOrder, Carry),
14 delegate sentry(CustomerOrder, Shipped);
15 };
Table 5.1 lists all GSM operators supported by gsmc. Most of the operators deal with
the GSM lifecycle model and act on status attributes and events. The only exception is
the self.attributeID–>exists( expression) operator, which existentially quantifies over a data
attribute of type set. The condition is true if at least one element of attributeID satisfies the
expression. Note that this operator cannot be directly verified in a concrete model, since
this is essentially a first-order sentence. Finally, we permit the following arithmetic and logic
operators:
Arithmetic operators: addition (+) and subtraction (−);
Logic comparison operators: equal to (==), not equal to (! =), less than (<), less than or
equal to (<=), greater than (>), and greater than or equal to (>=).
5.1.3 Agent File
The agent description file follows closely the definitions of role and agent from Section 3.1.1. We
now provide the syntax of the file, which consists of a list of modules. Each module defines either
a role or an agent. All lists inside a module are comma-delimited and end with a semicolon. As
every agent requires a role, the roles come first in the file.
Listing 5.1 describes a role module from the Order-to-Cash running example. The structure
is similar to the declaration of a class in object oriented programming. Each module starts with
the keyword role and a name, as shown on Line 1. The view field on Line 2 is a list of all
visible data attributes from ν, that any agent of this role can observe in the artifact system. The
window field on Line 8 contains the formula for ωi(ι), that determines which artifact instances
are exposed to agent i. The symbol $$ is a placeholder for the name of the agent. For instance,
the Buyers can see only those orders that belong to them. The fieldinstantiation on Line 9
lists all artifact types that agents of this role may instantiate. The corresponding instantiation
events are added to . To specify the status attributes and events that are added to ν and , the
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Listing 5.2: Agent definition from Order-to-Cash agent file.
58 agent Diogenes {
59 role: Buyer;
60 vars: bool cancelled = false ,
61 int order = 20;
62 protocol:
63 CustomerOrder: {CustomerOrder./CustomerOrder/BuyerId} == ‘‘Diogenes’’,
64 Create: {CustomerOrder./Create/ProductQuantity} == order,
65 Submit: {CustomerOrder./Submit/SellerId} == ‘‘EDSAC’’,
66 Receive: true,
67 Cancel: true −> cancelled = true;
68 };
field transformation on Line 10 holds a set of GSM transformation operators [LBH13] that
allow to hide parts of the lifecycle model of Γ from an agent of this role.
Valid atomic operators for artifact type R are as follows: hide stage status(R, s) and
hide milestone(R, m) remove the status attribute of stage s and milestone m from the set
of projected status attributes; delegate sentry(R, χ) excludes the sentry χ from collecting
the set of exposed events, so that no triggering event of χ is in . For the convenience of
specification, we also use the following macro GSM transformation operators in addition to the
atomic ones: condense stage(R, s) eliminates all sub-stages of s and delegates the sentries
of all its milestones; eliminate stage(R, s) condenses stage s, hides its status attribute and
status attributes of all its milestones, and delegetes all its guards.
Listing 5.2 shows an agent module. The module begins on Line 58 with the keyword agent
and a unique name. The role of the agent is assigned on Line 59. Each agent must have exactly
one role. The private variables of the agent are defined in the list vars of variable names with
their type and initial value on Line 60.
The protocol field on Line 62 lists entries for all events e the agent can send to the artifact
system. The entries have the form e : γ -> µ, where the condition γ is given in terms of data
attributes, the payload of the event, and the private variables; the update function µ defines
new assignments for the local variables as described in Section 3.1. Multiple entries for the
same event are treated as a disjunction.
In this example, the formulas on Lines 63, 64, and 65 specify payloads for events Cus-
tomerOrder, Create, and Submit respectively. These events can be executed at any time and
their payloads are ultimately assigned to data attributes when the event is consumed by the
i-Hub. Events Receive on Line 66 and Cancel on Line 67 can also be executed at anytime. The
former has no effect on either payload or local variables, and the latter assigns the value true to
the private variable cancelled.
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AG forall(‘x’, ‘CustomerOrder’)(Diogenes.Cancelled || x.BuyerId != ‘Diogenes’
|| K(‘Diogenes’)(EF GSM.isMilestoneAchieved(‘x’, ‘Received’))
Figure 5.1: A sample formula in gsmc.
5.1.4 Specification File
We defined the specification language IQ-CTLK in Section 3.4.1. Here we present a machine-
readable syntax for the logic. The specifications are supplied togsmc in a plain text file using
a context-free language, where formulas are delimited by a semicolon. An IQ-CTLK formulaf
has the following formal grammar:
f ::= expression | !f | f && f | f || f | EX f | AX f | EF f | AF f
| EG f | AG f | E(f UNTIL f) | A(f UNTIL f) | K(‘agentID’)(f)
| forall(‘variable’, ‘artifactID’)(f) | exists(‘variable’, ‘artifactID’)(f)
where variable is an instance variable bound by a quantification operator; artifactID is the
identifier of an artifact type defined in the i-Hub file; agentID is the identifier of an agent defined
in the agent file; and expression is an atomic expression that can be evaluated to either true
or false in every global state of the artifact system. The definition of expression is similar to
the one presented in section 5.1.2, but with only three GSM operators and with the addition of
agent variables:
expression ::= constant | agentID.attributeID | variable.attributeID
| expression aop expression | expression lop expression
| GSM.isStageActive(‘variable’, ‘stageID ’)
| GSM.isMilestoneAchieved(‘variable’, ‘milestoneID ’)
| variable.attributeID–>exists(attributeID = expression)
For instance, the property in Figure 5.1 states that buyer Diogenes knows that all his orders
can always be received as long as they are not cancelled. This is specified in IQ-CTLK as
follows:
AG ∀x : CustomerOrder((x.BuyerId 6= Diogenes ∧ ¬Diogenes.Cancelled)
→ KDiogenes EF x.Received)
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5.2 Implementation Details
In this section we present a general overview of the implementation and provide the high-level
design of gsmc for both concrete and abstract modes. Although the workflow differs for the
verification of concrete and abstract systems, both methods share most of the code base, as the
modular design allows a high degree of flexibility. The tool performs all steps automatically
upon execution. We conclude the section with compilation and usage instructions.
5.2.1 Development Tools
gsmc is written in the C++11 standard of the C++ programming language. We use the popular
CUDD library [Som12] for symbolic BDD operations and employ the flagship open-source SMT
solver CVC4 [BT13]. We chose this solver as it supports all required theories listed in Section 4.4,
is one of the fastest and most complete, and has a compatibile licence. We use RapidXml parser
for parsing XML/XSD files containing i-Hub GSM programs. It is a small, fast, and free XML
DOM-style parser. The parsers for the text files are implemented in the standard compiler
generators flex and GNU Bison.
5.2.2 Architecture
The internal architecture of the model checker for the verification of concrete artifact systems is
illustrated in Figure 2.7. The design is modular and the workflow consists of the five high-level
phases described below.
Parsing of Inputs. The tool reads the inputs described in the previous section by using three
parsers. The XML parser transforms the i-Hub GSM program into an internal representation of
the system, which consists of a hierarchy of objects representing the artifacts. The agent parser
extends this internal representation into a full GSM-MAS. Finally, the specification parser creates
parse trees of the formulas. The final internal representation is cross-referenced and checked for
semantic errors and inconsistency. We use data structures such as lists and maps from the stan-
dard template library to represent the model. The parsers are implemented accross the following
files: xmlParser.cc, xmlParser.hh, agentDriver.cc, agentDriver.hh, agentScanner.ll,
agentParser.yy, xpressionDriver.cc, xpressionDriver.hh, xpressionScanner.ll, and
xpressionParser.yy. The internal data structures are implemented in source files: agent.cc,
agent.hh, dataTypes.cc, and dataTypes.hh.
PAC Rules Processing. The PAC rules templates from Table 2.1 are instantiated to generate
the set of ground PAC rules using the parsed information about the available guards, stages,
and milestones. The ground rules are instantiated for every instance ι that can appear in the
system. We bound the number of possible instances prior to the invocation of the verification
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Algorithm 7 topologicalSort(Q)
1: while |Q| 6= 0 do
2: n← Q.pop()
3: if n.colour = 0 then
4: n.colour ← 1
5: P .push(n)
6: while |P | 6= 0 do
7: n← Q.top()
8: if n.nextChild() 6= ∅ then
9: n← n.nextChild()
10: if n.colour = 0 then
11: n.colour ← 1
12: P .push(n)
13: else if n.colour = 1 then
14: ERROR: circular dependency
15: end if
16: else






23: end whilereturn R
process. The dependencies among the ground PAC rules are analysed by constructing the
event-relativised dependency graph, which is used to perform a topological sort. If a dependency
cycle is detected, the GSM model is not well formed; the verification is halted and a cycle that
violates the acyclicity condition is produced and presented to the user.
We build the dependency graph as described in Section 2.1.2. The nodes correspond to
guards, stages and milestone and the edges between them have associated ground PAC rules.
Algorithm 7 describes the topological sort of this graph that determines the order in which
the ground PAC rules are applied. The algorithm takes stackQ of unsorted nodes and returns
stack R of nodes in their topological order; stackP is auxiliary. Once the nodes are sorted, we
examine the inbound edges of the nodes one by one and sort the ground PAC rules accordingly.
After that, any ground PAC rule that has not been selected yet does not depend on any other
rule and is pushed to the front. This code is included in files: dataTypes.cc and dataTypes.hh.
Construction of BDDs. Starting from the sorted set of ground PAC rules, BDD variables are
allocated to attributes, events and private variables of agents. Encoding of the three supported
data types requires the following number of BDD variables: 1 for a Boolean variable; dlog2 |E|e
for an enumeration variable, where E is the set of all enumeration values; and dlog2(u− l + 1)e
for a bounded integer variable, where u is the upper bound and l is the lower bound. This step
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Algorithm 8 buildReachableStateSpace(I,A,δ)
1: X ← ∅, Y ← I, Z ← ∅
2: while X 6= Y do
3: X ← Y
4: for ∀i ∈ A do
5: Z ← Z ∨ (Y ◦ δi)
6: end for
7: Z ← Z ◦ δ
8: Y ← Y ∨ Z
9: end while
10: return X
also considers the dependencies among variables to reduce the size of the resulting BDDs.
The tool then generates BDD representations of the PAC rules and events and constructs
the transition relation of the artifact system and the agents following the procedure described
in Section 3.3. gsmc supports equality checks for Boolean and enumeration variables. The
full range of comparison operations is permitted for bounded integers. The operations not,
and, and or are supported for Boolean variables, while the arithmetic operations + and −
are supported for bounded integers. In case of arithmetic underflow or overflow, a special
Boolean flag indicating such a condition has occurred is used. This is included in source files:
dataTypes.cc, dataTypes.hh, agent.cc, and agent.hh.
Construction of Reachable State Space. AC-MAS has a turn-based semantics where
one of the agents sends an event and the artifact system reacts to it. We compute the set of
reachable states by alternating transition relations of the agents and the system. We build the
set gradually by applying the transitions on the current set of reachable states, starting from
the initial state, until we reach a fixed point. Algorithm 8 describes the process using BDDs,
where X, Y , and Z represent sets of states, I is the initial state, δ is the transition relation of
the artifact system, and δi is the transition relation of agent i. The algorithm is implemented in
the main source file gsmc.cc.
Verification of Formulas. The properties from the specification file are checked one by one
by traversing parse trees of the formulas. First, the IQ-CTLK formulas are rewritten into CTLK
formulas by replacing the quantification operators with formulas that range over the actual
instances as described in Section 3.4.2. Then they are verified by using the standard fixed-point
labelling algorithm for CTLK given in Section 2.2.4. All computations use the transition relation
that was constructed in the previous phase and result in a BDD representation of the set of
states in which a formula holds. If this set contains the initial state, the formula is true in the
model; it does not hold otherwise. The verification is implemented in the file gsmc.cc.
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5.2.3 Abstract Model
Figure 2.8 describes the internal architecture of the model checker for the verification of abstract
artifact systems. The workflow follows closely the concrete architecture presented in the previous
section with several significant modifications. Here we give an additional abstraction phase that
comes after parsing the input, and list the modifications made to other steps.
Construction of Abstract Model. In this additional step we create the abstract model from
the concrete model by replacing all data attributes and private variables with Boolean predicates.
This is to replace the potentially unbound data from the concrete system by predicates that
capture the key conditions in the concrete system and preserve its behaviour just enough to
verify key specifications. The key advantage here is that with an increasing bound placed
on the data the verification of the concrete system gets harder, while the size of the abstract
system stays the same. Details on how this replacement affects sentries, views, windows, and
protocols are given in Section 4.2.1. After this step, the PAC rules processing is identical to the
concrete mode with the predicates replacing the expressions in ground PAC rules. This module
is implemented in source files: dataTypes.cc, dataTypes.hh, agent.cc, and agent.hh.
Construction of BDDs. Temporal changes of the concrete system are reflected by predicate
changes in the abstraction. However, these predicate updates may be approximate. Therefore,
we need to construct over- and under-approximations, which are represented as may and must
transitions. These transitions are computed by queries to an SMT solver, whenever an update
to data occurs in the system, e.g., in phase 1 of the GSM artifact system. This step implements
Algorithm 6 from Section 4.2.2. Other steps, such as application of the PAC rules, are done as
before. The transition relations are computed only once and reused for the construction of the
reachable state spaces, as well as the verification of all the properties. The interface to the SMT
library is implemented in files cvc4expr.cc and cvc4expr.hh.
Construction of Reachable State Space. The turn-based semantics is preserved. However,
since we now have two temporal relations, we construct two reachable state spaces – may and
must. Note that these state spaces are identical if the two transitions are equal, in which case
there is a definite answer to all queries.
Verification of Formulas. Both may and must temporal and epistemic relations are used
to evaluate the specifications. There may not be a definite answer to a query if may and must
differ, in which case the tool returns unknown truth value of a formula. The IQ-CTLK formulas
are syntactically translated to the µ-calulus by using the function T from Section 2.2.4. The
tool implements highly optimised algorithms to compute the sets for the epistemic µ-calculus,
as described in Section 4.1.1.
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5.2.4 Usage
gsmc is a command line application developed for Linux operating system. The toolkit can be
downloaded from [GGL+13].
System Requirements:
Platform: x86-64 compatible processor.
Operating system: Linux.
Compiler: GNU g++ 4.4.3 or higher, flex 2.5.4 or higher, GNU bison 2.4.2 or higher.
Installation:




-m File XML file containing the GSM model
-a File plain text file containing agent descriptions
-s File plain text file containing specifications
-i Number bound for artifact instances
-d Number Number range for the range integer data types
-c verification of the concrete system; abstraction enabled otherwise
-h help
Example: ./gsmc -m siena.xml -a agents.txt -s formulas.txt -i 2 -d 0 3 -c
5.3 Comparison with State-of-the-Art Model Checkers
Table 5.2 summarises the features of most popular model checkers. We argue that none of these
tools can be directly applied to the verification of GSM-MAS due to the declarative nature
of GSM combined with the need of supporting data and agents. It is hard to make a direct
Name Modelling Specification Model Checking Predicate
Language Language Technique Abstraction
MCMAS [LQR09] ISPL ATL, CTLK Symbolic, BDD No
NuSMV 2 [CCG+02] SMV LTL, CTL Symbolic, SAT No
SATABS [CKSY04] C/C++ Reachability Symbolic, SAT Yes
BLAST [BHJM07] C Reachability Symbolic,Constraints Yes
C2bp [BMMR01] C Reachability Symbolic, SAT Yes
Table 5.2: Summary of state-of-the-art model checkers.
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quantitative comparison between gsmc and the listed model checkers due to the substantial
differences in modelling and specification languages, as well as in the core model checking
algorithms. Here we consider some general and qualitative comparisons.
gsmc implements many new features to tackle problems associated with GSM-MAS. Specifi-
cally, the application of authorisation views requires that visible attributes in local states of
agents change dynamically, the declarative semantics of GSM needs to be translated into FSM,
and the tool operates directly on GSM programs produced by the i-Hub engine. Most crucially,
though, we implemented a 3-valued abstraction technique, which, to the best of our knowledge,
makes gsmc the first symbolic model checkers that support 3-valued abstraction. The main
disadvantage of the tool is that it does not provide some standard functionalities, notably the
counter-example generation and the abstraction refinement.
From the traditional model checkers, the closest to gsmc is MCMAS. It has been specifically
designed for MAS, supports epistemic modalities, and implements powerful BDD-based symbolic
model checking techniques. In fact, gsmc is loosely based on MCMAS and some algorithms for
the verification of concrete systems have been lifted from this model checker. However, new
approaches were required to handle the specifics of GSM. For instance, authorisation views and
predicate abstraction are completely new features that MCMAS does not support.
SATABS, BLAST, and C2bp are the most popular tools based on predicate abstraction.
These model checkers differ significantly from gsmc, in that they focus on the verification of
C programs against temporal safety and reachability properties and use either the SAT or
constraint solvers for computations. In contrast, gsmc operates on declarative MAS, supports
a rich temporal-epistemic language, and implements 3-valued abstraction via SMT.
In this chapter we introduced the prototype model checker gsmc. We described input
languages and presented an overview of the implementation. We discussed the limitations and
drew comparisons to existing tools. In the next chapter we evaluategsmc on two case studies.
6 Experimental Evaluation
In this chapter we evaluate gsmc and the techniques on two substantial case studies: the Order-
to-Cash [HDDM+11] and the Flanders Research Information Space program [TGMODLM13].
Both systems are complete i-Hub applications. We verify the temporal-epistemic properties of
the systems and discuss performance of the implemented techniques. All tests were conducted
on a 64-bit Fedora 17 Linux machine with a 2.10GHz Intel Core i7 processor and 4GB RAM.
6.1 Order-to-Cash
Recall that in the Order-to-Cash [HDDM+11] application a seller schedules the assembly of a
product based on a confirmed purchase order from a buyer that requires several components,
which are sourced from different suppliers. When the product is assembled, a carrier ships the
order to the buyer. The buyer can cancel a purchase order at any time before the delivery.
The GSM program is specified in 780 lines of XML and consists of a single-artifact i-Hub
application with 10 data attributes, 9 stages, 11 milestones, and 12 events. We model collection
of components by introducing an integer counter. The process is considered complete when 3
components have arrived. The following three agent roles interact with the artifact system: 1)
a Buyer who creates an artifact instance that represents the order; 2) a Seller who fulfils the
order; and 3) a Carrier who ships the finished product to the Buyer.
We constructed several GSM-MAS with different numbers of agents and bounds on artifact
instances. We now report on the verification of these systems against four temporal-epistemic
specifications. In the following Diogenes is an agent of role Buyer. The first specification,
Property 6.1, states that Diogenes knows that the product can always be received via any of his
orders as long as these are not cancelled, i.e., that there is no deadlock in processing the order:
AG ∀x : CustomerOrder((x.BuyerId 6= Diogenes ∧ ¬Diogenes.Cancelled)
→ KDiogenes EF x.Received) (6.1)
Property 6.2 states that Diogenes may come to know that a product is received for an order
with a different owner. This checks whether orders are private to the buyers:
EF ∃x : CustomerOrder(x.BuyerId 6= Diogenes ∧KDiogenes x.Received) (6.2)
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Property 6.3 encodes the ability of an agent to deduce information it can not directly observe
by checking whether Diogenes always knows there are 3 PurchaseOrders collected in all of his
orders when the milestone Ready is achieved:
AG ∀x : CustomerOrder((x.Ready ∧ x.BuyerId = Diogenes)
→ KDiogenes (x.PurchaseOrders = 3)) (6.3)
The last specification, Property 6.4, encodes the ownership of the order. It implies that an
agent other than Diogenes can cancel an order that belongs to Diogenes. This is done by using
a private variable, which is set true only if Diogenes executed the Cancelled event. We thus
require that an order that belongs to Diogenes can not be cancelled if this variable is false:
EF ∃x : CustomerOrder(x.BuyerId = Diogenes ∧ x.Cancelled ∧ Diogenes.cancelled 6= 1) (6.4)
We first verified the properties in the abstract system and measured the number of may and
must reachable states, memory used, and CPU time required. gsmc evaluated Property 6.1 to
be to be unknown, Properties 6.2 and 6.4 to be false, and Property 6.3 to be true in the abstract
model. Note that although x.PurchaseOrders is not observable for Diogenes, this property holds
as it is true in all in all epistemically equivalent states where the milestone holds. We remind
the reader that since we use both over- and under-approximations simultaneously, if a property
is true, respectively false, in the abstract model we can deduce it is true, respectively false, in
the concrete one as well.
Only when a property is unknown, e.g., in the case of Property 6.1, we have an inconclusive
result. Nevertheless, the abstract model can be refined such that the property can be verified. The
tool does not support automatic refinement for the abstraction methodology, but, by manually
adding the predicates x.PurchaseOrders = 0, x.PurchaseOrders = 1, and x.PurchaseOrders = 2,
we can refine the abstract model in such a way that may and must reachable state spaces
are equal to the concrete one. In doing so, the model checker returns definite results. Thus
Property 6.1 is no longer returned as unknown but true.
Table 6.1 reports the performance for a system with one agent per role and a system of 15
agents (6 Buyers, 5 Sellers, and 4 Carriers). We observe that there is an order of magnitude of
difference in the number of may and must reachable states; this implies there are specifications,
such as Property 6.1, that cannot be determined. However, the model checker was still able
to find answers to the other three properties. The results were in line with our expectations,
confirming the correctness of the GSM program against said specifications.
For comparison we disabled the predicate abstraction feature and verified the same Order-
to-Cash system under the same conditions. In this case gsmc evaluated Properties 6.1 and 6.3
to be true and Properties 6.2 and 6.4 to be false in the model, which is consistent with the
abstraction results. Note that the previously unknown Property 6.1 is returned as true when
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Table 6.1: Performance for different numbers of artifact instances ι and agents; #ι is the bound
on instances; #may, respectively #must, is the number of states reachable via may, respectively
must, transitions; MB is the memory used; s is the CPU time taken.
3 agents 15 agents
#ι #may #must MB s #may #must MB s
1 0.91 e2 0.45 e2 55 0.2 1.65 e3 5.89 e2 69 2.1
2 2.23 e3 5.27 e2 78 0.9 1.32 e6 1.55 e5 106 4.6
3 5.34 e4 5.45 e3 93 4.8 1.03 e9 3.83 e7 124 31.9
4 1.28 e6 5.46 e4 112 25.5 7.99 e11 9.02 e9 233 168.8
5 3.10 e7 5.42 e5 172 90.4 6.05 e14 2.05 e12 463 596.2
6 7.57 e8 5.36 e6 273 257.2 4.53 e17 4.57 e14 898 2014.2
Table 6.2: Performance for different settings of the concrete system; #ι is the bound on instances;
#states is the number of reachable states; MB is the memory used; s is the CPU time taken.
3 agents 15 agents
#ι #states MB s #states MB s
1 1.17 e2 27 0.1 2.92 e3 31 0.2
2 3.71 e3 52 0.7 4.16 e6 70 4.9
3 1.16 e5 64 5.9 5.82 e9 84 65.5
4 3.67 e6 96 42.1 8.01 e12 222 360.2
5 1.18 e8 195 176.7 1.09 e16 539 1419.6
6 3.83 e9 375 500.5 N/A N/A N/A
predicate abstraction is not enabled, which is in line with the results obtained by verifying the
refined abstract system.
Table 6.2 presents the performance of the tool executed on the same machine, under the same
conditions as before. When we compare the performance with Table 6.1, we see that the concrete
verification initially outperforms abstraction. This is because there is a constant overhead,
specifically, the calls to the SMT solver that is used to build may and must temporal transitions.
However, as the model grows we clearly see the benefits of the abstraction methodology in
reducing the number of states considered. For example for 15 agents and 5 instances we have
over two orders of magnitude reduction in the number of states to be considered and an order
of magnitude reduction in the verification time. This difference increases with the number
of agents and instances until the tool can no longer return an answer without the predicate
abstraction enabled.
An important point to note is that by using predicate abstraction we obtain a procedure that
is much more robust against complex data. For example a variable x.PurchaseOrders , which is
esentially a counter, is unlikely to cause severe difficulty even without predicate abstraction if
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role Program_Manager { agent Manager {
view: Assembled, DBDecision, role: Program_Manager;
Eligible, PMConfirmation, vars;
ReviewBoardSize, Reviewers; transition:





role Program_Staff { agent Staff {
view: Assembled, DBDecision, role: Program_Staff;
Eligible, PMConfirmation, vars;
ReviewBoardSize, Reviewers; transition:












Figure 6.1: Roles and agents in the FRIS program.
the threshold is set to 3. However, setting the threshold to 3000 would require a procedure not
employing predicate abstraction to consider all the many values for the variable in question. In
contrast our abstraction technique treats both cases equally, puts no bound on variables and,
all things being equal, would have the same performance in both cases.
6.2 Flanders Research Information Space Program
We now evaluate the performance of gsmc on the Flanders Research Information Space (FRIS)
program of the Flemish government [TGMODLM13]. An i-Hub application for the FRIS
program has been developed as one of the two pilots during the ACSI project.
The FRIS program is centred around three strategic goals: accelertion of the innovation
chain by efficient and fast access to research information for all stakeholders; improved customer
services; and increased efficiency and effectiveness of the R&D policy. The goals are achieved
through the change management process and service development. These services and processes
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assist stakeholders in the innovation ecosystem by facilitating their tasks.
The case study focuses primarily on the management of research programmes. Several
agencies provide funding to various research projects. Research programs are classified as either
large or small. Large projects are internationally oriented and usually count between fifty and
sixty research proposals, while small projects are nationally oriented and can contain well over
one thousand research proposals. It is assumed that a funding agency has a permanent expert
panel for the review process. This panel is the only entity involved in the reviewing of small
research project proposals. An external review board gets involved in large projects.
The GSM-based artifact framework is well suited to the FRIS project as the stakeholders
share a common environment within the ecosystem. The scenario consists of three conceptual
entities modelled as business artifacts: CallForProposals represents the annual call of a funding
program; Project corresponds to one project that starts as a proposal and, if successful, becomes
a fully-fledged research project; ReviewBoard governs assembling of a review board for a specified
research topic and the review of all corresponding proposals. Many stakeholders play a role in
the FRIS scenario but here we focus on only three roles: the Program Manager initiates the
process and confirms the board; the Program Staff Member supervises projects on behalf of the
funding agency, the Project Leader is responsible for a particular proposal.
The i-Hub GSM program is a significantly larger application than the Order-to-Cash,
consisting of 45 stages, 56 milestones, and 19 events. For this reason we model interactions
between agents and the ReviewBoard artifact type only, i.e., types CallForProposals and Project
are not analysed. Nevertheless, the tool builds the transition relations for the whole GSM
program. We also restrict the number of agents to one per role.
Figure 6.1 shows the roles and agents in the FRIS system. An artifact instance is created
when agent Manager decides to set up a review board. He also confirms the assembled board,
at which point the lifecycle of the ReviewBoard instance terminates. Agent Staff does most of
the work, including assembling and updating of the review board. Both Manager and Staff can
access of all instances. In contrast, agent Leader cannot observe anything. Agents do not set
specific payloads, which means we examine all possible behaviours non-deterministically.
We now go trough a number of properties for the scenario. The first two specifications concern
the simple reachability of stages and milestones. Property 6.5 states that there is an instance of
the ReviewBoard artifact type in which eventually the stage SendProposalsToReviewers is open:
EF ∃x : ReviewBoard(x.SendProposalsToReviewers) (6.5)
Property 6.6 encodes that there is an instance of ReviewBoard in which eventually the mile-
stone ReviewsTerminated is achieved. This means that an instance will successfully terminate:
EF ∃x : ReviewBoard(x.ReviewsTerminated) (6.6)
The next two specifications illustrate reasoning about data. They demonstrate the 3-valued
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Table 6.3: Performance results for 1 instance of the ReviewBoard artifact type.
Operation Result Memory Time
Computation of τm and τM X 395MB 33.16s
Computation of Rmay and Rmust X 364MB 3.06s
Property 6.5 X 280MB 1.21s
Property 6.6 X 284MB 1.02s
Property 6.7 X 278MB 0.80s
Property 6.8 X 272MB 0.92s
Property 6.9 X 312MB 1.54s
Property 6.10 7 320MB 2.22s
abstraction on sets of data. Note these specifications cannot be verified on the concrete system
as we do not have a mechanism to encode the sets into supported data types. Property 6.7 states
that there is an instance of ReviewBoard in which eventually the size of the set of reviewers is
equal to the specified number of reviewers required:
EF ∃x : ReviewBoard(x.Reviewers.size() = x.ReviewBoardSize) (6.7)
Property 6.8 states that there is an instance of ReviewBoard in which eventually the set of
reviewers contains a reviewer called Diogenes :
EF ∃x : ReviewBoard(x.Reviewers.exists(FirstName = Diogenes)) (6.8)
The last two specifications concern reasoning about knowledge of agents. Property 6.9 says
that agent Manager knows there is a path where eventually the milestone ReviewsTerminated
is achieved:
KManager (EF ∃x : ReviewBoard(x.ReviewsTerminated)) (6.9)
Finally, Property 6.10 encodes that agent Leader knows there is a path where eventually the
milestone ReviewsTerminated is achieved:
KLeader (EF ∃x : ReviewBoard(x.ReviewsTerminated)) (6.10)
We conclude this section with a short discussion on the verification results and the perfor-
mance of the tool. The data attributes of the concrete model are represented by 10 predicates
in the abstract model. The abstract model is then encoded by the model checker into BDDs
by using 142 Boolean variables. As the construction of the transition relations requires three
distinct sets of Boolean variables, there are 426 Boolean variables in total. The may reachable
state space of the model spans over approximately 7.1× 109 states, and its construction requires
30 iterations. The must reachable state space has 8.4× 107 states and it is built in 12 iterations.
The total CPU time taken was 43.88s and the memory usage peaked at 395MB.
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Table 6.3 presents the performance of the individual operations undertaken by gsmc, as well
as the verification results. The first row reports the construction of the transition relations, the
second row shows the construction of may and must reachable state spaces, and the remaining
rows give the performance for the properties verified in this section. Properties 6.5 to 6.9 are true
in the model. Property 6.10 is also false in the model since the agent Leader does not observe
anything about the ReviewBoard lifecycle. Note, that the evaluation of the last specification is
slower as it requires computation of both tt and ff sets for the formula.
7 Conclusion
In this chapter we give final remarks on the research described here and draw conclusions on
model checking GSM-based multi-agent systems. We also discuss existing work related to this
thesis, along with possible future developments.
7.1 Contributions
The goal of the research presented in this thesis was to develop automatic model checking
techniques for the practical verification of GSM-based multi-agent systems. The theoretical
contributions can be categorise into the following three areas:
1. A mechanism to reason about GSM programs in the context of multi-agent systems.
In this thesis we put forward a technique for the practical verification of business artifacts
in the context of multi-agent systems by extending GSM, a modelling language for artifact
systems. In Section 3.1 we extended plain GSM programs with a set of external agents to
form GSM-MAS. This extensions provides a mechanism to better model and verify complex
interactions between agents and the artifact system, including powerful concepts of ν, ω
and . We established the formal mapping f from GSM-MAS to AC-MAS, a semantics
for reasoning about multi-agent systems in a quantified setting of the artifact system
environment. In Section 3.4 we defined the temporal-epistemic logic IQ-CTLK, which
supports quantification over artifact instances, and showed how to verify an AC-MAS
model against specifications in this language.
2. Translating declarative specification of artifact lifecycles into finite-state machines.
We presented a methodology to model check declarative models of artifact systems by
translating GSM artifact systems into a symbolic transition system used for symbolic model
checking. In Section 3.3 we showed how to generate an AC-MAS transition system that
corresponds to a given GSM-based artifact system by computing the transition relation δ
using the incremental semantics of GSM. To create a finite symbolic representation, we
introduced a bound on the number of instances that can be generated and used coarse
abstraction to create finite data.
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3. Implementation of abstraction techniques for verification of infinite-state systems.
We put forward a predicate abstraction techniques aimed at verifying the infinite state
spaces arising in a multi-agent system against specifications given in the epistemic µ-
calculus. Specifically, we shown how epistemic models with under- and over-approximations
can be generated via SMT calls, how epistemic specification can be checked directly on
these abstractions. We identified the conditions under which the checks on the abstract
models can ensure results on the concrete models of the program.
In Section 4.1 we extended the technique to the epistemic setting and introduced the 3-
valued semantics for the epistemic µ-calculus Extended AC-MAS. We defined a simulation
relation between two systems that preserves both satisfaction and refutation of a property
and gave sufficient conditions for an abstraction to ensure the simulation relation.
In Section 4.2 we presented a methodology for constructing abstract Extended AC-MAS
from concrete GSM programs. We showed that these abstractions preserve both the
satisfaction and the refutation of epistemic µ-calculus specifications. We discussed how
the abstract states and transition relations are defined using predicates and how they are
computed by calling an SMT solver. We proved correctness of the methodology.
In Section 4.3 we illustrated the 3-valued abstraction technique on the Order-to-Cash case
study.
Having developed the theoretical background, we implemented the prototype model checker
gsmc. The tool is an important contribution of the research reported in this thesis.
4. Implementation of the techniques in a model checker.
gsmc implements many new features to tackle problems associated with GSM-MAS.
Specifically, the application of authorisation views requires that visible attributes in
local states of agents change dynamically, the declarative semantics of GSM needs to
be translated into FSM. Most crucially, though, we implemented a 3-valued abstraction
technique, which, to the best of our knowledge, makes gsmc the first symbolic model
checkers that support 3-valued abstraction. The main disadvantage of the tool is that it
does not provide some standard functionalities, notably the counter-example generation
and the abstraction refinement.
In Section 5.1 defined the syntax of the inputs. gsmc operates directly on artifact systems
designed in the i-Hub editor that can be deployed on the i-Hub engine after the verification.
In Section 5.2 we gave a general overview of the implementation and presented the high-
level design of gsmc for both concrete and abstract modes. In Chapter 6 we evaluated
gsmc on two substantial case studies: the Order-to-Cash and the Flanders Research
Information Space program. The results suggested that the verification time and memory
requirements of the tool are feasible even for realistic scenarios with models.
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7.2 Related Work
In this section we compare the techniques presented in this thesis with the existing work in the
literature.
We based the technique on the work presented in [SG08], where the authors investigate
3-valued abstraction for µ-calculus. In comparison to this work, we have extended the idea to
the epistemic logic, developed a practical algorithm based on an SMT solver, and tailored the
technique to the case of GSM-based artifact systems.
A possible alternative approach would be existential abstraction. The advantage of 3-valued
abstraction over this method is that it is more general and produces sound results for both
true and false formulas. Existential abstraction is, however, better suited for the abstraction
refinement. For instance, CEGAR [CGJ+03], which iteratively refines the abstract model by
removing spurious transition found in the model, cannot be directly applied when a formula is
unknown, as there are no counter-examples.
Existential abstraction has been studied for AC-MAS framework from a theoretical perspec-
tive in [BLP11, BLP12a, BLP12b, BL13]. The obtained results identify decidable fragments
through restrictions on the specification language and the semantics. While these results are
certainly valuable, they provide no constructive methodology for the practical verification.
Another abstraction technique of interest is the mixed transition system [DGG97]. The
framework defines free and constrained transitions, analogous to may and must transitions of
KMTS, but unlike in KMTS, the set of constrained transitions is no longer a subset of the set of
free transitions. The abstraction still preserves the soundness and improves precision of chosen
abstract domains. On the downside, the method does not provide an obvious choice of an
appropriate abstract domain with corresponding abstract operations, which can be performed
automatically.
A technique, called semantic minimization [GH05, AH06], has been proposed to improve
the precision of the 3-valued model checking algorithms. The authors have shown that many
temporal logic patterns in the intersection of CTL and LTL ive full precision for the 3-valued
model checking algorithm, and unknown means that some abstraction refinements satisfy and
some others do not satisfy the property. It would certainly be valuable to investigate how the
method could be applied on epistemic extension of temporal logics.
Building a completely new model checker is a complex and challenging task. The best tools
currently available have been in development for many years, in some cases even decades. We
argue that none of these tools can be directly applied to the verification of GSM-MAS due to
the declarative nature of GSM combined with the need of supporting data and agents. It is
hard to make a direct quantitative comparison between gsmc and the listed model checkers due
to the substantial differences in modelling and specification languages, as well as in the core
model checking algorithms. Here we consider some general and qualitative comparisons.
From the traditional model checkers, the closest to gsmc is MCMAS. It has been specifically
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designed for MAS, supports epistemic modalities, and implements powerful BDD-based symbolic
model checking techniques. In fact, gsmc is loosely based on MCMAS and some algorithms for
the verification of concrete systems have been lifted from this model checker. However, new
approaches were required to handle the specifics of GSM. For instance, authorisation views and
predicate abstraction are completely new features that MCMAS does not support. On the other
hand, MCMAS supports richer specification languages and the counter-example generation.
SATABS [CKSY04], BLAST [BHJM07], and C2bp [BMMR01] are the most popular tools
based on predicate abstraction. These model checkers differ significantly from gsmc, in that
they focus on the verification of C programs against temporal safety and reachability properties
and use either the SAT or constraint solvers for computations. In contrast, gsmc operates
on declarative MAS, supports a rich temporal-epistemic language, and implements 3-valued
abstraction via SMT.
7.3 Future Work
We conclude with a discussion on some limitations and possible further work. The potential
benefits of 3-valued abstraction are huge as the verification of infinite-state systems is, in
general, undecidable. However, it does not come without a cost. Predicate abstraction is best
suited for control-flow oriented verification. Calling the SMT solver can involve a substantial
computational cost if we cannot generate reasonable predicates for the data structures.
One limitation of the work presented here is that we cannot generate predicates for all GSM
expressions over data, which may lead to unknown results. In particular, the approach does not
support recursion in GSM programs. Recursive data types are currently beyond the realm of
model checking techniques. Moreover, the current formalism permits only one level of nesting
of sets in data attributes. While arbitrary nesting would be hard to achieve, a limited form
could be addressed. For instance, Partitioned Normal Form (PNF) for nested relations has been
suggested in the database literature [RKS84]. The PNF enforces a key-based constraint at each
level of set nesting and can be mapped into flat relational data structures. An additional step
to flatten nested set could be carried out before predicates are generated.
The major limitation of the abstraction technique is that at present we do not support
automatic refinement when the verification result is unknown. In this case we need to heuristically
determine which predicate is the cause of the failure and split it. Currently, the only option is
to perform the heuristic and add required predicates manually. However, as mentioned earlier,
the addition of predicates can split the abstract states in such a way that the refined model
becomes less precise, since a must transition can be lost when a predicate is added. This makes
automatic refinement even harder. This is probably the most important avenue for the further
research.
The research presented in this thesis focuses mainly on extensions of CTL, a tree-based
temporal logic. However, a significant area of research in model checking and Business Process
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Management works with LTL, a linear-time temporal logic. It would be therefore useful to
generalise the results to the LTL setting. Both the theory and the engine implementation are
based on µ-calculus and we translate IQ-CTLK to epistemic µ-calculus (see Section 2.2.4). Since
µ-calculus subsumes both CTL and LTL, the generalisation is possible if we provide translation
of LTL formulas. A general translation, however, has a doubly exponential time complexity in
the length of the LTL formula [Dam92], which renders the approach impractical for complex
specifications.
The optimisation for the computation of the must transition does not work for non-
deterministic systems, as we assume that there is a must transition iff there is only one
may transition from the source state. This holds only for deterministic systems such as GSM.
Also, better support for inter-artifact interactions when many artifact instances can be related
to one another would be an interesting addition to gsmc.
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